


AN EXAMINATION OF FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT IN CIVIL WARS:

SOMALIA 1991 TO - , AFGHANISTAN 1979 TO -

by

Michael Joseph Franks



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## APPROVAL BY THESIS DIRECTOR

This thesis has been approved on the date shown below:

Ludwig W. Adamec      May 1, 1996  
Ludwig W. Adamec      Date  
Professor of History

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## DEDICATION

I would like to dedicate this thesis to my parents, Dana and Evelyn Franks, who taught me to set goals and work hard to achieve them. Also, to my wife Kerry (Redmann) Franks who stood by me and took over the duties of managing our family through my long hours of research and absence.

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### ABSTRACT

Foreign involvement in Somalia and Afghanistan has included military aid such as hardware and training, and humanitarian aid including assistance with infrastructure improvements and food. This research showed that the effects of foreign involvement in the internal affairs of Somalia and Afghanistan were not seriously investigated, nor the long-term ramifications of foreign military and humanitarian aid sufficiently analyzed to allow the interdicting powers to adequately predict the impacts of intervention.

Foreign involvement has been a contributing factor in the present unstable conditions in Somalia and Afghanistan and has not helped them attain the goal of national direction and independence, however, tribalism in its various forms must account for the instability experienced in both Somalia and Afghanistan. Tribalism manifests itself in many forms including favoritism in governmental appointments, and regional distribution of aid dollars and food. In both these societies members consider themselves a component of a family or a clan/tribe first, their national identity follows and is much less important. Any amount of aid will not bring about national stability or a nationalist state of mind in populations so intensely tribal.

To support these findings historical examples and the present situations are discussed.



#### 4. INTRODUCTION

Examples of foreign intervention abound throughout history. Alliances, colonialism, and invasions have been methods used by external forces to shape the politics, economies and histories of virtually every nation existing today. The United States and the Russia (Soviet Union) have long considered themselves the most important players at the poker table of international politics. During the progress of the "Great Game" stacks of chips change hands and the players seats change from time to time. The chips, blue, red and white are colonies and countries, natural resources and people. Afghanistan and Somalia are just two of the chips that the United States and the Soviet Union have tried to control over the years.<sup>1</sup> The methods and results of this attempted control have launched Afghanistan and Somalia into the forefront of international attention for the last twenty years.

During the Cold War era the competition was fierce between the East and West for control of areas deemed strategic at any given time. Areas of importance and the reasons for their importance have changed from time to time but ideological differences between East and West have kept the race for international influence in motion.

##### 4.1 The Problem

The problem of foreign intervention in any country is one of attempting to forecast the outcome of intervention. To accurately forecast an outcome the interloper must have a clear and accurate understanding of a multitude of variables present in a nation ranging

from ethnic and religious considerations, to the time frame and forms the intervention will take. The record of any nations attempts at influencing the actions of another to ones own benefit is dismal.

When forecasting the means of intervention in Somalia and Afghanistan both the East and West failed to consider many of the human factors involved in both countries. For instance, both countries have numerous tribes/clans which vie for power but tribal affiliation is stronger in Somalia; they both possess predominantly Muslim populations but Afghanistan's population is composed of tribes/clans and several sects of Islam. Foreign interventionists also failed to consider factors relating to the result of providing advanced weapons and uncontrolled humanitarian aid to these populations.

#### 4.2 Objectives

This research will examine the methods employed by the United States and the Soviet Union in particular and the industrialized nations in general, and the effects of these actions on Somalia and Afghanistan. Superpower methods included political and economic maneuvering and pressure, military hardware supply, poorly programmed humanitarian aid and outright invasion. A comparison of theoretical international policy and the present situation following intervention will help illuminate the importance of considered and implemented intervention policy. The research will focus on the methods, impact, and the outcome of competitive foreign intervention based on the foreign relations theories espoused by the major international players.

First, a brief study will be made of the history which formed the international relation theories and policies of the United States and the Soviet Union. A short recounting of the situations which contributed to the civil wars of Somalia and Afghanistan will be provided, including the pre-civil war political situation, the geography, an overview of the clan/tribal system, religion, and early foreign intervention.

Second, the civil war period will be examined with a comparison of impacts of tribalism in its many forms, the goals of various parties involved in the civil wars, and the plight of the refugees during the conflict.

Third, the situation in both countries will be explored following the withdrawal of the military forces of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan and the United States/United Nations from Somalia, in regard to factional feuding, civil conditions of life, and current outside involvement.

Fourth, the fallacy of the assumption that aid, military or humanitarian, which considers only the wishes of a foreign power, will bring national solvency and sovereignty from chaos, will be described.

This research will test a number of popularly held policies implemented by the political leaders of the developed countries at the expense of underdeveloped countries, in this case, Somalia and Afghanistan.

### 4.3 Methodology

The Soviet Union and the United States have been involved in both Somalia and Afghanistan. This research will be conducted as a comparative analysis on a historical basis to examine the involvement of the developed nations in attempts at securing their interests in the target countries and the respective regions, and the impact of that involvement on the development of Somalia and Afghanistan to their present state.

Research includes a general discussion of the theories for foreign relations endorsed by the two major participants of foreign intervention, the United States and the Soviet Union. The scope will then be narrowed to focus on those policies and how their implementation affected Somalia and Afghanistan. Finally the research will describe how the internal factors of Somalia and Afghanistan, culture, tradition, and religion affected the ultimate withdrawal of superpower military forces and the effectiveness of aid organization efforts.

### 4.4 Sources

Sources have been chosen with an effort to ensure a balanced view of the events, actions, and effects. Sources include United States Government official statements, published literature, periodical articles and public releases of aid organization statements. Particular attention was taken to use sources produced by individuals with first hand knowledge and experience of Somalia and Afghanistan during the civil wars and authors recommended by other authors with solid credentials.

Sources for Afghanistan include: Barnett Rubin's The Fragmentation of Afghanistan 1995, The Bear Trap 1992, by Brigadier Mohammad Yousaf, Mark Urban's War in Afghanistan 1990, and Afghanistan: The Soviet War 1985, by Edward Girardet. Rubin has experience as an election monitor in Pakistan in the employ of the US Information Agency, as a UNESCO conference participant in Kazakhstan, and as a member of Asia Watch in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Mohammad Yousaf was a Brigadier General in the infantry of Pakistan and became the Director of the Afghan Bureau of Pakistan intelligence from 1983-1987, during which time he gained intimate knowledge of the Afghan resistance and its leaders. Mark Urban's book is an excellent analysis of the war in Afghanistan.

Primary sources for Somalia are: The Invention of Somalia 1995, edited by Ali Ahmed, Blood and Bone 1994, by Ioan Lewis, Mohamed Sahnoun's Somalia: Missed Opportunities 1994, and Michael Maren Feeding a Famine 1994. All noted authors with extensive experience in the region of the "Horn of Africa." Mohamed Sahnoun lived in the region for more than a decade, has filled the post of deputy secretary-general of the Organization of African Unity, led a United Nations fact finding mission to Somalia in 1992, and was head of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). Ioan Lewis has been performing ethnological and anthropological research in what is present day Somalia continually since 1955 for Oxford University. Michael Maren was an aid worker for the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in 1981 and has extensive experience with other aid organizations in Somalia until the present.

## 5. POLICIES LEADING TO SUPERPOWER INTERVENTION

### 5.1 History of Superpower Foreign Relations

Only seven years after throwing off the label of "colony" and even though Thomas Jefferson, one of the United States' founding fathers suggested that the nation should mind its own business, the new nation's leaders were debating over joining the Holy Alliance.<sup>2</sup>

The United States of America fought hard to win its independence from Great Britain.

Her citizens wanted to be a nation, not a colony. In a letter to Baron von Humboldt dated December 6, 1813, Thomas Jefferson wrote,

The European nations constitute a separate division of the globe; their localities make them part of a distinct system; they have a set of interests of their own in which it is our business never to engage ourselves. America has a hemisphere to itself. The insulated state in which nature has placed the American continent should so far avail it that no spark of war kindled in the other quarters of the globe should be wafted across the wide ocean which separate us from them. And it will be so.<sup>3</sup>

By 1817, John Quincy Adams had been appointed Secretary of State under President Monroe because he was the country's most experienced figure in foreign affairs. He wrote on 5 July 1820, to Henry Middleton, a South Carolinian who was then the minister to Russia. "It was intimated that if any question should arise between the United States and other governments of Europe, the Emperor Alexander, desirous of using his influence in their favor, would have a substantial motive and justification for interposing if he could regard them as *his allies*, which, as parties to the Holy Alliance, he would."<sup>4</sup> We

were already fully embroiled in the poker game, no longer one of England's blue chips, but now a player with our own hand and a pile of chips.

The United States of America despite all Jefferson's good intentions to keep our interests in our own hemisphere in just a few years was ready to go out and conquer the world for democracy. Tentative dabbling in world affairs began with the Spanish-American War of 1898, fostered by the fact that the United States had become a prominent world power by virtue of its tremendous economic growth since the Civil War. Industrialists and agriculturists felt the United States must find new markets for the fruits of her production, and religious leaders felt that Americans had an obligation to "take up the white man's burden" to deliver our culture and religion to the poor and backward nations of the world.<sup>5</sup> The United States expanded the scope of its role in world affairs by taking part in numerous wars, or conflicts around the globe, and by joining or helping to form cooperative organizations such as the League of Nations in 1920, the United Nations in 1942, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949.

Another extremely important step taken by the government of the United States occurred in March 1947. President Truman addressed Congress, he said, "It must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." Congress appropriated \$400,000,000 and the *Truman Doctrine* was born.<sup>6</sup> During the ascendance of the Soviet Union and now, following its demise, the United States sees itself as the role model

and peacemaker of the world, distributing material goods (including food) and justice around the globe.

The Bolsheviks felt they too should mind their own affairs immediately after they overthrew their Czar, but not for long. The basic element of Lenin's doctrine of communism was expansion to bring about a world socialist order. The leaders of the new Russia continued its expansion and by the end of World War II Stalin had annexed territory in Eastern Europe of 400,000 square miles. Poland and Czechoslovakia are glaring examples of Russian expansionist ideals, as Cuba, Angola, Somalia and Afghanistan are just several of the more recent examples. However, their Marxist/Leninist ideology was in direct opposition to democracy as practiced by the United States.

Communist Russia had long considered the United States its principle obstacle to achieving world domination of their form of communism. An ideological "State of War" could be said to have existed between the East and West with many battlefields located in the Third World. In efforts to avoid potentially disastrous open war the Soviet Union often operated through negotiation. This was acceptable as long as Soviet communism was not compromised. Lenin wrote, "Negotiations are one tool among many others in the conduct in the international class struggle, to be judged by its utility in advancing Soviet objectives, but without any inherent value in itself."<sup>7</sup> The reasons for Soviet involvement



in Afghanistan and Somalia can be traced to the Soviet interpretation of peaceful coexistence. Brezhnev stated,

We Communists have got to string along with the Capitalists for a while. We need their credits, their agriculture, and their technology. But we are going to continue massive military programs, and by the middle of the 'Eighties' we will be in a position to return to a much more aggressive foreign policy, designed to gain the upper-hand in our relationship with the West.<sup>8</sup>

The West was not ignorant of the aspirations of the emergent Soviet Union.

In a post World War II address to the Westminster College in Missouri, March 1946

Winston Churchill, Prime Minister of Great Britain spoke these immortal words:

A shadow has fallen upon the scenes so lately lighted by the Allied victory. Nobody knows what Soviet Russia and its Communist international organization intends to do in the immediate future, or what are the limits, if any, to their expansive and proselytizing tendencies...From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the Continent. Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest, and Sofia, all these famous cities and the populations around them lie in the Soviet sphere and all are subject in one form or another, not only to Soviet influence but to a very high and increasing measure of control from Moscow...The Communist parties, which were very small in all these Eastern states of Europe, have been raised to preeminence and power far beyond their numbers and are seeking everywhere to obtain totalitarian control...in a great number of countries, far from the Russian frontiers and throughout the world, Communist fifth columns are established and work in complete unity and absolute obedience to the directions they receive from the Communist center.<sup>9</sup>

In this manner the Cold War between the West and the East began. The next forty-three years would be filled with the Communist East bloc trying to spread its

socialistic ideology to governments across the world and the West rushing in trying to check their every gain with one for democracy. That is precisely the way the Great Game was played in Somalia and Afghanistan. From the moment of their established independence the Soviets advanced propositions of military and economic aid and their communist/atheistic ideology. Later the United States and the United Nations would follow suit.

## 5.2 Superpower Foreign Policy In The 1970'S

Foreign policy theory of the United States and the Soviet Union had been guided in recent years by the continuing Cold War and strategic and geopolitical interests around the globe. The theory of United States policy at this time was one of containment of communist influence and the securing of regions near sources of materials of strategic importance as an extension of the Cold War mind set. Credibility of United States threats and posturing and the resolve of President Carter to uphold foreign policy were obviously in question as shown by the Iranian takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran in November 1979, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979.<sup>10</sup>

During his bid for President, Ronald Reagan's 1980 foreign policy platform, endorsed by the Republican party, was to "restore U.S. superiority vis-a-vis the USSR in the world."<sup>11</sup> U.S. influence and superiority had suffered after the debacle of Vietnam, Iran, and Afghanistan. Acting on his belief that the Soviet Union was the chief cause of unrest in the world, Reagan achieved the passage in May 1982, of National Security

Document 32 calling for a build-up of the armed forces to a level capable of defeating an aggressor in either conventional or nuclear war. An important component of his plan was to form alliances with states in the Middle East with Israel constituting the center piece.<sup>12</sup> Somalia had been ideologically important as an obstacle to continued Soviet influence in Lybia, Ethiopia, Yemen and Angola into the 1980's. Somalia was geographically important for its proximity to the oil fields of the Arabian Peninsula and Gulf, and its blocking position of the Suez Canal and Red Sea.

The Soviet Union's stated foreign policy in theory had been to support workers movements toward a socialist state anywhere in the world, while assigning a high priority to movements which might cause discomfort for it's chief military and ideological antagonist, the United States. When in 1976, the U.S. cut off military aid to Ethiopia due to human rights abuses during it's war against Soviet backed Somali guerrillas, the Soviet Union stepped in to attempt to broker a peace; its goal being the formation of a socialist federation consisting of Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea and South Yemen. Somali overtures to the U.S. resulted in the Soviet abandonment of Somalia in favor of Ethiopia. Limited U.S. arms supplies to Somalia and massive Soviet arms supplies to Ethiopia resulted in the defeat of the Somali backed organization, the Western Somali Liberation Front of Ethiopia. Foreign military arrived in Ethiopia reaching 11,000 Cubans and 1,000 Soviet advisors by early 1978.<sup>13</sup> In 1979 the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan.

U.S. policy towards Afghanistan in the 1980's was evidence of the re-emerging strength of the commitment of the United States to assist movements fighting Soviet

aggression and communism by providing advanced weapons and mines to counter Soviet power.

With the rise to power of President Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze 1985 to January 1991, was a time of reconsideration of national goals and foreign policy theory for the Soviet Union. In a speech in July 1986 the first signs of a major shift in Soviet foreign policy in relation to Asia were made evident. President Gorbachev stated that the USSR would reduce the number of troops along the Sino-Soviet border and stated that six regiments of Soviet troops would be withdrawn from Afghanistan by the end of 1986.<sup>14</sup> The withdrawal from Afghanistan and relative inaction during the Gulf War are examples of the continued new theory which expressed disappointment with previous policies of military intervention in the Third World.<sup>15</sup>

1991 marked the end of an era, the Cold War. The Soviet Union collapsed leaving the Russian Federation to assume the seat of the USSR on the United Nations Security Council; however, it lacked the willingness to support the old allies of the Soviet Union around the world. The United States was left as the single superpower.

## 6. SOMALI AND AFGHAN SITUATION BEFORE THE CIVIL WARS BEGAN

### 6.1 Somalia

About the end of the 19th century France, Great Britain and Italy were in competition for colonizing the African coast. On the African continent itself, Egypt, and later Ethiopia sought to expand their realms. Britain's interest in the northern Somali

coast followed their establishment of a coaling station in 1839 at Aden on the short route to India. The British living at the Aden station relied heavily on the importing of foodstuffs from the nearby Somali coast. France likewise had its station at Obock and Italy opened their Aseb station in 1869. Not to be outdone by these Europeans, Egypt raised her flag over Bulhar and Berbera in 1870 by reviving Turkey's old claim to the Red Sea coast.

At first Britain protested the Egyptian claim, but later found them to be a convenient buffer against further encroachments by the French and Italians. When Egypt was forced to evacuate its Somali possessions in 1885 because of the revolt in the Sudan, the British government decided to fill the gap. Between 1884 and 1886, treaties of protection were drawn up with the main northern Somali clans guaranteeing them their "independence." Somali territory was not fully ceded, but a British protectorate was proclaimed and vice-consuls appointed to maintain order and control. Meanwhile France had been extending its colony from Obock and the Italians were extending their Eritrean colony and encroaching on Ethiopian territory.

In 1889, Ethiopia and Italy signed the Treaty of Ucciali, which the Italians concluded established their own protectorate over Ethiopia. Also in 1889, Italy acquired two more protectorates in the northeastern corner of Somalia and by the end of the year the southern Somali coast had been sublet to an Italian company by the British East Africa Company. In 1896, at the Battle of Aduwa, the infiltrating Italian armies were given a crushing defeat by the Ethiopians led by Emperor Menelik II. Italy, France and

Britain signed treaties with him curtailing their Somali possessions. Italy gave up Somali Ogaden, and Britain lost much of the western Haud from its protectorate. The Somali clansmen were not consulted, but left abandoned by the Europeans and became ripe for acquisition by Ethiopia.

Early in the 20th century the British Somaliland protectorate administration found its rule threatened by the "Mad Mullah", Shaykh Mohammad ibn 'Abd Allah Hasan of the Ogaden clan.<sup>16</sup> A devout follower of the Salihiya order, he came into conflict with a Christian mission in 1899. With the European and Ethiopian colonizations of their lands still festering, the Somalis quickly followed Shaykh Mohammad into a major insurrection. The Shaykh displayed great skill in employing all the traditional tactics of Somali clan politics in building up his following. He strengthened his cause with a call to national Muslim solidarity against the infidel colonizers. This strategy gained him arms and ammunition supplies from other Islamic sources that were previously denied to Somalia. His rebellion continued until their stronghold at Taleh was bombed in 1920.

Following the Shaykh's defeat the rebellion was squelched administrative control under the British colonial office was restored until the protectorate was evacuated in 1940. It was recaptured with Italian Somalia in 1941 when Ethiopia was liberated. In 1948 the Ogaden and the Haud were gradually surrendered to Ethiopia and in 1950 the Italians returned to Somalia with ten years to prepare the country for independence under a United Nations trusteeship. Plantation agriculture under Italian tutelage had short-term success, but Somali products never became internationally competitive.

In 1955, the protected Italian market was a mixed blessing for the 94,000 ton Somali banana sector. It made possible the penetration of the Italian market, but didn't encourage Somali producers to seek other markets. The investment in cotton showed fewer long-term results than did bananas.<sup>17</sup> The establishment of the independent Somalia came in 1960, but the politics of the Republic were still based on tribal allegiances.

The first major problem to arise was the joining of the area from the British protectorate with the former Italian trust territory. Their legal and judicial systems had to be adjusted, administrative and bureaucratic realignments had to be made and a great deal of delicate political maneuvering had to occur.

The first independent government was a coalition of the Somali Youth League and the Somali National League. The Somali National League was based in the north and the first prime minister, 'Abd al-Rashid Shermarke came from the south. Mohammad Ibrahim Igal became the minister of education and Aden 'Abd Allah 'Uthman from the Somali Youth League was confirmed as the first president in July 1961. There was an aborted *coup d'etat* in December 1961 and Igal resigned in September of the following year. In 1963 the Somali Republic broke off relations with the British because they refused to surrender the Somali areas of Ethiopia and Kenya, and by the end of the year the Republic turned to the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union for military assistance. The Somali Ogaden tribe in Ethiopia came out in open revolt. In 1967 Shermarke defeated 'Uthman for the presidency and nominated Egal as prime minister. A

British ambassador returned to Muqadishyu and friendly meetings with agreements were held with Ethiopia and Kenya.

The Greater Somali policy which stressed self-determination and eschewed violence was taking effect. The state of emergency had ended. Then, on October 15, 1969 President Shermarke was assassinated and on the 21st the government of Prime Minister Egal fell to a military coup led by Major General Muhammad Siyad Barre and so began the period of unrest that led into the civil war that continues today 26 years later.

## 6.2 Afghanistan

The history of Afghanistan has developed over the centuries largely determined by its geographical location at the center of Central, West, and South Asia. Peoples from many ethnic and linguistic groups have migrated through the region since ancient times and armies have moved through taking temporary control and leaving behind traces of their culture. Afghanistan saw periods of flourishing trade and wealth and great empires. It was pushed and pulled between conflicts among strong neighboring powers. The diverse populous was not joined into a single entity until Ahmad Shah Durani founded a monarchy in 1747 that ruled the country until 1973. But because there was no strong military and political successor to follow on in his footsteps after his death, the kingdom he had created in Afghanistan disintegrated.

Afghanistan continued to be the arena of conflict between the Mughal Empire of India and the Safavi Empire of Iran throughout the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth



centuries. Then in the nineteenth century it lay between the great expanding empires of Great Britain and Russia. The same patterns that affected Afghanistan in the 1500's apply today. Because it holds a strategic location great rival powers have tended to view the control of Afghanistan by an opponent as unacceptable. At times this has worked for their benefit, but more often they have suffered terribly amidst the power struggles.

Afghanistan's internal politics have been considered no more than a reflection of international rivalries. The many different groups that make up the populace have also been hard to govern except in response to the threat of foreign invasion.

The largest ethnic group, the Pashtun along with other tribal warriors from remote areas have been able to hold off the foreign invasions of Alexander the Great, Genghis Khan, Timur and Ahmad Shah. Russian control extended into Central Asia through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and the Afghans, like the Turks and Iranians wanted to benefit from relations with the Soviet Union, but did not wish to be consumed by them.

In 1747, under the leadership of the first Pashtun ruler, Ahmad Shah Durrani the nation of Afghanistan finally began to form after centuries of fragmentation and rule by invaders. Ahmad Shah was very personable and charismatic and he gained the respect of the tribal leaders and established his authority throughout the Afghan area. His successors of the Abdali tribe of the Pashtun ruled Afghanistan through 1826 when Dust Muhammad took control of the throne in Kabul with help from his mother's Qizilbash tribesmen.

Dust Muhammad welcomed the British mission in 1837 with hopes they would help him win back Peshawar from the Sikhs. When the British could not assure him of

their assistance and a Russian agent was received in Kabul, the British mission left for India and the British governor-general Lord Auckland ordered an invasion of Afghanistan. They installed Shah Shuja' as a puppet ruler, but the Afghans would not tolerate him or foreign occupation and insurrections broke across the country until the British found their position untenable. As they retreated the Afghans massacred them and killed Shah Shuja'.

In 1843 Dust Muhammad returned to rule in Kabul, but his successor Shir 'Ali Khan and his successor and son Ya'qub Khan continued the struggle with British and Russian missions. Under 'Abd al-Rahman Khan, a cousin of Shir 'Ali, the boundaries of northern Afghanistan were drawn by the British and the Russians. The Durand Line of 1893, which formed the eastern border, divided zones of responsibility for the maintenance of law and order between British India and the Kingdom of Afghanistan; it was never intended to be an international boundary.

Afghanistan became a buffer state between Czarist Russia and British India. In 1919, Aman Allah began a month-long war with the British to gain the right to conduct their own foreign affairs. In 1921, the Afghans signed a treaty of friendship with the new Bolshevik regime in Russia and thereby became the first nation to recognize the Soviet government and a "special relationship" evolved between the two governments and lasted until December 1979.

After signing the treaty of friendship with the Bolsheviks, Aman Allah established an Afghan air force in 1921 starting with a few Russian planes and a pilots. He alienated

the army by first raising their pay and then lowering it again. He then further enraged the tribes by preventing the tribal leaders from controlling who joined the army and by increasing the period of conscription from two years to three.

In 1923 Afghanistan's first constitution, guarantee of civil rights, universal national registration and identity cards, a legislative assembly, a court system, prohibition of blood money, abolition of subsidies and privileges for tribal chiefs and the royal family all radically reformed the political and judicial systems. Economic reforms included a reorganization of the entire tax structure, anti-smuggling and anti-corruption campaigns, a livestock census for taxation purposes, the first budget, use of the metric system, establishment of a national bank, and introduction of a new currency.

Aman Allah's reforms were a means for his opponents to transform a minor tribal revolt into a major uprising. Religious leaders who felt threatened by the changes sided with the tribal leaders who were losing their power. His efforts to create a strong central government flew in the face of the historical tribal separatism. The Shinwari tribe revolted in Jalalabad in late 1928 and Tajik forces advanced on Kabul from the north. Aman Allah went into exile in Italy.

The Tajiks ruled for a mere nine months before the powerful Pashtuns took control under Nadir Shah, a descendent of the great Dust Muhammad. Nadir Shah quickly abolished most of Aman Allah's reforms, but in spite of his efforts his army grew weak while the tribal and religious leaders regained their power. He pacified the religious faction with constitutional emphasis on orthodox principles. Roads were constructed,

communication improved, commercial links were made with the foreign powers that Aman Allah had created diplomatic relations with in the 1920's. His son Zahir Shah replaced him on the throne when he was assassinated in 1933. Zahir Shah and his powerful uncles tried to avoid both the Soviet Union and Britain by seeking expertise from Germany to help set up factories and build hydroelectric plants.

The United States officially recognized Afghanistan in 1934 when they joined the League of Nations. Afghanistan made pacts of friendship and nonaggression with Turkey and Iran and proclaimed neutrality during World War II on 17 August 1940. In October the British and Soviet governments demanded that Afghanistan expel all nondiplomatic Axis nationals. Since Britain and the Soviet Union had invaded and occupied Iran when they ignored a similar demand, Zahir Shah complied. World War II disrupted Afghanistan's blossoming foreign relations and some domestic goals, but it did serve to increase their markets for agricultural produce.

After the war, Afghanistan developed a closer relationship with the United States through the Hilmund Valley Project in 1945, but by 1950 the United States had begun sponsored a number of treaty organizations in efforts to contain communism. Through these organizations the United States developed a strong relationship with Pakistan as she was a member of the Baghdad Pact (later the Central Treaty Organization or CENTO) and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). The United States and the United Kingdom offered Afghanistan the opportunity to join the Baghdad Pact but Afghanistan refused due to a treaty of non-aggression previously arranged with the Soviet Union.<sup>18</sup>

Following cross border attacks by Afghan frontier tribesmen Pakistan stopped vital shipments of petroleum to Afghanistan, reminding the Afghans that they were a landlocked country.<sup>19</sup> As tensions mounted both Afghanistan and Pakistan requested arms from the United States. Pakistan's membership in CENTO and SEATO was the deciding factor in a United States decision to provide arms to Pakistan not Afghanistan. So, in July 1950, Afghanistan responded to offers of aid by signing a major agreement with the Soviet Union becoming "the first country outside the communist bloc to receive Soviet aid."<sup>20</sup>

This agreement was far more than a barter arrangement to exchange Soviet oil, textiles, and manufactured goods for Afghan wool and cotton; the Soviets offered aid in construction of petroleum storage facilities, oil and gas exploration in northern Afghanistan, and permission for free transit of goods to Afghanistan across Soviet territory. It also provided a political balance to American aid in the Hilmund Valley.<sup>21</sup>

### 6.3 Geography of Somalia and Afghanistan

The Somali Democratic Republic occupies most of the area along the eastern coast of the African continent known as the Horn of Africa. To the north its coastline is on the Gulf of 'Adan and to the east is the Indian Ocean. Somalia has an area of about 246,000 square miles with 46 to 56 percent considered permanent pasture, 14 percent classified as forest, 13 percent suitable for cultivation with wells and roads improvements. The entire north coastal area is a barren plain, the Guban, with hot humid weather, low rainfall and

almost no vegetation. Moving inland the Guban gives way to the mountain ranges called the Ogo Highlands.

To the south of the mountains is the Haud Plateau where vegetation is found suitable for camel grazing. It receives more rain than the Guban and is cooler and drier. Artificial water reservoirs have been constructed throughout the Haud to supply the livestock and people of the area. The Nogal Valley runs from northwest to southeast and is relatively well watered. Erosion over the past few years has taken away much of the valley's rich soil and thick vegetation.

To the south of the Nogal Valley is the Mudugh Plain which also supports a pastoral economy. The area in southern Somalia between the Jubba and Shabeelle rivers has soils with clay, alluvial deposits and fine black soil which makes plantation agriculture possible. The Somali society can be grouped into four main communities defined by its geographic location and climatic conditions: nomadic pastoralists, agropastoralists, agriculturalists, and coastal people.<sup>22</sup>

Somalia's geopolitical position has great strategic significance with access into the African continent, the Gulf of 'Adan, the Indian Ocean, and the Arabian Peninsula. In ancient Egyptian writings Somalia was known as Punt, "the land of aromatics and incense" and the coastal areas were open to the rest of the world to export frankincense and other precious gums, ostrich feathers, slaves from further inland, wild animal skins, and exotic birds. Then, between the seventh and tenth centuries immigrant Muslim Arabs and Persians developed a series of trading posts along the Somali coasts. In the eleventh

century Shaykh Isma'il Jabarti, ancestor of the Darud clan came from Arabia and settled in the northeastern corner of the peninsula.

Approximately two centuries later Shaykh Ishaq, ancestor of the Ishaq clan also came and settled and as their numbers grew they pushed inland to the southwest. By the sixteenth century the clans and subclans of northern Somalia were well established. In 1542 the Ethiopian Christians were victorious over the Somali Muslims and ended any chance of expansion westward, so with the influx of new migrants they moved south. The coastal towns of Marka, Brava, and Muqadishyu were penetrated by the Galadi clan who by the late 1800's ruled the lower reaches of the Shabeelle river.

The Gulf of 'Adan and the Indian Ocean set the permanent north and east/southeast borders of Somalia. The western border, because of the existence of Somali communities in Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti and the nomadic way of life that is characteristic of the people is constantly in dispute.

Afghanistan is located in south central Asia. It is slightly larger than Somalia with an area of 252,100 square miles, but where Somalia is bordered on three sides by water, Afghanistan is completely landlocked, the nearest coast three hundred miles south on the Arabian Sea. Afghanistan is very close to Texas in size and population, but it is set in a place that is even drier and more barren, and (most telling) its annual product output is only the smallest fraction of Texas', perhaps one or two percent.<sup>23</sup> The country is shaped like a leaf: the Vakhn Corridor forms the stem to the northeast with the Hindu Kush mountain range its southern border. The towering mountain range moves into the country

to the southwest dividing the rich fertile northern provinces from the rest of the country and then fanning out into several different directions.

Mountains divide Afghanistan into three distinct geographical areas. The Northern Plains are fertile and highly cultivated and densely populated. The region also holds rich mineral resources and deposits of natural gas. The Central Highlands are the Hindu Kush mountain area. It is a part of the Himalayan chain and has deep narrow valleys and peaks rising above 21,000 feet. The Southwestern Plateau is an area of high plateaus, sandy deserts, and semideserts. The Hilmund and several other large rivers cross the Southwestern Plateau.

Somalia and Afghanistan are approximately the same size countries in area. Somalia is stretched out along the Horn's coastline making the northern and southern ends of the country very different places. Although at first look Afghanistan seems much more compact (with the exception of the Vakhan Corridor), the Hindu Kush mountains splitting the country in half also create major differences between north and south Afghanistan. The problems created for the inhabitants due to the contrasting physical features of the geography that surrounds them further curtails a national spirit and encourages the tribal or clan ties they have with others that share their challenges.

A plantation farmer from the southern Shabeelle Valley region has little in common with a nomadic Somali who grazes livestock in the northern Guban coastal plain.



#### 6.4 The Clan/Tribal System

In Somalia, "at as young an age as five or six years, children are capable of reciting their full genealogy to their clan-family ancestor."<sup>24</sup> As each son is born the patrilineal line extends. Each child takes the name of his father as his surname and receives a new first name. So the son of Ahmad is named Muhammad Ahmad and his son is named Khalil Muhammad Ahmad and so forth. This patrilineal genealogy system was probably introduced into Somalia by the Arabian sheikhs themselves since it is more typical of the Semitic societies than of African cultures which tend to be matrilineal.<sup>25</sup>

The six major clan-families are the Darud, the Hawiye, the Ishaq, the Dir, the Digil and the Rahanwayn. The Darud Clan, the largest clan-family in Somalia, was founded by Shaykh Darud Jabarti the son of Isma'il Jabarti a Muslim saint. Darud settled on the African coast and married Dumbira Dir, the daughter of a local patriarch. Shaykh Ishaq, also an immigrant from Arabia is claimed to have been a descendent of 'Ali and Fatimah the daughter of the Prophet. Shaykh Ishaq is the ancestor of the Ishaq clan-family. The Dir clan-family is tracing its genealogy to the Arab ancestor 'Aqil Abu Talib (a brother of 'Ali).<sup>26</sup>

The Dir, Darud, Hawiye, and Ishaq clans which represent about seventy percent of the country's population are primarily nomadic pastorals. The Dir are located primarily in the northwest near the Djibouti border area. The Ishaq clan also graze livestock in the Guban around the Gulf of 'Adan coastal port of Berbera and inland Hargeisa. The Darud are split between the actual point of the Horn and the southern most area between

Kismayu and Kenya. The Hawiye clan is also split between the coastal area surrounding the capital city of Muqadishyu and the inland area along the northern portion of the Kenya border.

The two agricultural clans are the Digil who farm the coastal plantations between the Jubba and Shabeelle rivers and the Rahanwayn who are located in the upper valley region. The clans are prone to internal conflicts and schisms. Even among the Darud clan many of its members distinguish themselves as Ogadeen, Marrehan, or Majeerteen.

The genealogy which often goes back twenty or thirty generations to the clan-family ancestor is permanent and unchanging. The family solidarity that it represents is perpetual and always binding. This clan system from clan-family leader down to clan and primary lineage (also called a dia-paying group) and individual elder is organized democratically with every adult male having the right to speak.<sup>27</sup>

The Somali genealogies do not mirror political alignments. When two kinship groups unite against a common aggressor, their political relationship is not validated by genealogy. The political union is agreed upon by formal contract with all the details outlined, including in which respects they will act together and what actions will be regarded as grounds to dissolve the alliance or deserve punitive sanctions. These treaties are in no respects permanent, but are made exclusively to meet a specific situation. If different circumstances arise, the contract is broken or changed to meet the new needs of the groups involved. Alliances and realignments between various levels of groups is a constant characteristic of Somali clan politics.<sup>28</sup>

Afghanistan is a melting pot of many divergent tribes, languages, religious sects, and ethnic groups much like the United States. Throughout its history conquerors and missionaries have passed through Afghanistan and left traces of their culture and beliefs behind. Where the Somalis all look like dark-skinned Arabs, Afghans might have blond hair and blue eyes or dark skin and epicanthal folds. They may be tall, olive-skinned, mustachioed tribesmen or they may be a combination of any of those features.<sup>29</sup>

The household unit whether it is a nuclear family, an extended family, a fraternal joint family or a compound family is the immediate level of kinship. The kin group is then expanded to the minimal lineage which is the next level, then to the maximal lineage, then to the tribe and finally to the ethnic group. The relationship in Afghanistan between tribe and ethnicity is very complex and not all Afghans, even rural ones, consider themselves associated with a tribe. Ethnic physical features have melded over the years of interbreeding and within Afghan urban centers especially, ethnicity, religious sect, tribe, family and mode of subsistence intermesh and are to some extent indistinguishable.<sup>30</sup>

There are many ethnic groups in Afghanistan. Table 4.1 highlights eleven of the largest with their geographic location, religious sect preference, language, population and traditional mode of subsistence. The selection of major ethnic groups in Afghanistan as well as language, location, and religious classifications are quite arbitrary because there are a great many exceptions. All of these classifications vary greatly with specific situations.

The rugged mountainous topography of Afghanistan isolates communities from each other. Members of the same ethnic group or tribe that live in different locations have to conform to meet the challenges of their particular environment. Many of the tribal affiliations have been lost along the way. A tribe are those descendants of a common ancestor whose name often identifies the group. The concept of the tribe is referred to as *qawm* in Afghanistan. It includes more the group of people with common social and location ties than those who trace their lineage back twenty or thirty generations as the clans of Somalia. *Qawm* members have a common home territory, enjoy social fellowship and act as a unit in religious rituals.<sup>31</sup>

The Pashtuns of Afghanistan, an excellent example, are composed of eight tribal groups. The Pashtun tribes are the: Durrani, Ghilzai, Safi, Shinwari, Khostwals, Jadrans, Utman Khel, Mohmand, and the Yusufzai.<sup>32</sup> They base their shared kinship traced through the father on similar customs, traditions, and language.

The Pashtun, although they are members of the same *qawm*, are a diverse group with tribes of varying backgrounds, such as Turkic, but usually speaking Pashto. The Pashtun are the most numerous ethnic group and politically dominant. Most Pashtuns are Sunni. The Pashtun are well known for their strict code of behavior. Adherence to this code is referred to as 'doing Pashtu'. The code stresses honor and its defense, autonomy, bravery, self-respect, and respect for others. Pashtuns believe that Muslim and Pashtun are equal, so they often "do Pashtu" instead of following the tenants of Sunni Islam.<sup>33</sup> In other cases ethnicity make take a back seat to religious sectarianism.

TABLE 6.1 ETHNIC GROUPS IN AFGHANISTAN

ETHNIC GROUP	LOCATION	DIALECT	MUSLIM SECT	POP.	MODE OF SUBSIST.
Pashtun	NW/NE on Pakistan border and in the S,W&E of Afghan.	Pashtu some Dari	Sunni some Twelver Shi'ah	6.5 million	government some nomad herding & farming
Tajiks	W near Herat	Dari & dialect	Sunni and Isma'ili	3.5 million	farming & artisans
Farsiwans	W near Iran	Dari	Twelver Shia	600,000	
Qizilbash	urban centers	Dari	Twelver Shi'ah		
Hazaras	central	Dari dialect	every sect	870,000	unskilled labor
Uzbek	crescent on N. border	Uzbek (Turk)dialect	Sunni	1 million	farming & tradesmen
Turkmen	scattered on Soviet border	Turkic	Sunni		herders
Kirghiz	highmountain valleys of Vakhan	Turkic	Sunni	3,000	herders
Wakhi	lowlands of Vakhan	Iranian dialect	Isma'ili & Twelver Shia		
Nuristanis	Eastern area	Dari dialect	Sunni		herders
Arabs	NE	Farsi dialect	Sunni		herders
Baluch	SW	Baluchi			herders
ChadarAimak	NW	Turkic			
Pashi	NE Central				34

With both tribal and *qawm* affiliations comes a shared responsibility with the other members for offenses committed by any member. Liability is usually greater with a closer association to the offender, but anyone is fair game for retaliation. As stated earlier tribal association varies in importance with different ethnic groups and within the Pashtuns it is very important, especially to those who live in rural areas. Tribal affiliation is traced through the patrilineal kinship. Property, inheritance, marriage and all economic and political areas are encompassed by the patrilineal kinship.<sup>35</sup> Relations within this kinship group are strained because the members are all competitors for the same resources: money, property, position, and wives, consequently the mother's kinship are a more cordial group to socialize with. To quote an old Afghan saying, "Do I have an enemy?---I have a cousin!"

Ethnicity and tribalism unite Afghans with similar backgrounds and divide those who are different. In order to unite all Afghans in one group, that group must extend so far as to include all the differences. That is what Islam has tried to do by uniting them all under the blanket of shared goals and opposition to other religions, regardless of what Muslim sect they belong to.

#### 6.5 The Role Islam Plays in Somali and Afghan Society

Muhammad, the Prophet of Islam, established the first centralized Islamic state in which believers formed a single community, an *ummah*. The commitment to the Islamic

*ummah* ranks above tribal affiliations in a state structure based on Islam. However, immediately after the death of the Prophet, the Islamic community disagreed on the method by which a new leader should be chosen. The non-Qurayshi Arab tribes of demanded their right to be considered for the position. After an extended debate, Abu-Bakar, another Qurayshi, was chosen as successor. This struggle for leadership marked "the beginning of the end of Muslim solidarity."<sup>36</sup> The power struggle over leadership caused Muslims to shed the blood of their co-religious people and it continues today. Somali Arabized clans each invented their own myth of descent from the Prophet's tribe in order to dominate the positions of leadership in their area.

Somalia is unique on the African continent as the only country whose population is almost totally Muslim. Country reports show that the entire population follows the *Shafi'i* Sunni sect of Islam, but three Sufi orders do exist in Somalia. In contrast, Afghanistan has followers of the Sunni sect of the *Hanafi* school of thought, the Twelver Shi'ah sect, the Isma'ili sect, and a Sufi tradition. Although religious unity would seem to bind Somalia together, it has not achieved religious harmony any more than the heterogenous Afghanistan. The reason for this is again the Somali obsession with genealogical clan-families.

Like the nomadic groups of Somalia, Arabs before Islam were also divided and lacked a strong leadership, central government and cohesive society. Islam cemented their leadership and government with religious laws and ordinances (the *Shari'ah*).<sup>37</sup> In Somalia, the tribal bonding has prevailed over Islamic solidarity and Somalis remain

divided by their fixation on tribes and clans.<sup>38</sup> As recounted before, the Ishaq, Darud and Dir clans have created clan ancestor ties to the Prophet Muhammad to legitimize their claims on positions of power. These clan founders: Shaykh Darud Jabarti the son of Isma'il Jabarti a well-known Arabian saint, Shaykh Ishaq descendent of 'Ali and Fatimah the Prophet's daughter, and Dir descendent of 'Aqil Abu Talib brother of 'Ali are regarded by their Somali clan-families as Muslim saints complete with a growing collection of praise hymns and local shrines where their faithful descendants make their pilgrimages.

A similar process of Islamization of a traditional ancestor cult is taking place among the Gadabuursi. This clan which is traditionally known to be of Dir descent, is now stating that their clan ancestor/founder was 'Ali Samarun, a brother of Shaykh Ishaq. The supposed grave of 'Ali Samarun lies close to the grave of Shaykh Ishaq. The Gadabursi claim 'Ali Samarun is also a Muslim saint and his faithful descendants sing his hymns of praise and make their pilgrimages to his local shrine at Tukali.<sup>39</sup>

The divisions that Islam causes in Afghanistan are not due to the canonization of their individual tribe ancestors as in Somalia. The majority of Somalis recognize Sunni Islam but modify it to fit into their clan-based culture by canonizing certain ancestors. The majority of Afghan tribes have also adopted the Sunni Islamic sect but do not modify it's basic tenets. In Somalia, political leaders and their parties use religion only as a support for and to give credence to, their particular political agenda. In other words religion fills a secondary role for the Somali factions. Afghan factions invoke Islam as a major



component of their political goals, perhaps as a result of the recent attempt by the Soviets to install a communist, secular government, or as a reflection of the sponsors of the various factions; Iran, Saudi Arabia, etc.

#### 6.6 Early East-West Involvement in Somalia and Afghanistan

Western interference in early Somalia was in the form of colonization by the British, Italians and French during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Although the United States was not involved in this period. The influences of the Europeans did nothing to create nationalism among the Somalis. In British Somaliland, many of the nomads scorned European education and opposed the establishment of Christian missions. In the south, however, Somalis sent their children to colonial and mission schools.<sup>40</sup> The partition of the country also meant that the northern Somalis were taught an English-speaking legal and education tradition while the South learned the Italian language and Fascist discipline.<sup>41</sup> This early influence re-enforced the divisions in Somali society.

United States and Soviet interference began in both Somalia and Afghanistan with their declarations of independence. The Somalia Republic was established on July 1, 1960. Its strategic location near the oil-rich Middle East was of great value during the Cold War. Both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. sought to have a military presence in Somalia and the Horn of Africa.<sup>42</sup> Soviet influence began as early as 1962 with loans to finance the training and equipping of the armed forces. Their nonmilitary assistance included technical training scholarships, printing presses, broadcasting equipment and agricultural and

industrial development financing. The United States contributed nonmilitary aid in the form of grants for the training of a police force.<sup>43</sup>

On the 19th of August in 1919, The Republic of Afghanistan became an independent nation. The Afghans began cordial foreign relations with the Bolshevik leaders in Moscow immediately in an effort to move away from British control and influence. The Soviets were interested in the Afghans only for help in dealing with their dissident Soviet Muslims and in suppressing anti-Bolshevik elements in Central Asia. They signed a Treaty of Friendship and the Soviets gave the Afghans thirteen airplanes and pilots, transport and communication technicians, telephone lines between Kabul, Mazar al-Sharif, Herat, and Qandahar, and cash subsidies.

The United States began their involvement in Afghanistan as they had with Somalia, after the Soviets and with nonmilitary assistance. The Hilmund Valley Project between the Afghan government and an American company began in 1945 was designed to irrigate the semi-desert land of southwestern Afghanistan. Prime Minister Da'ud (1953-1963) felt that the earlier Afghan governments had been too pro-Western and he hoped to balance the past by improving relations with the Soviet Union but not have to sacrifice economic aid from the United States. He believed that the rivalry between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. and their desire to have allies in Central Asia put him in the position of being able to play one off the other for aid.

The Afghan government played the East-West game in the 1950's till the early 70's, manipulating both superpowers for its own gain and acquired large quantities of

Soviet weapons.<sup>44</sup> In January of 1954, the Soviets gave Da'ud a development loan of US\$ 3.5 million and in 1955 they made an agreement to trade Afghan raw materials for Soviet petroleum, metals and building materials. Late the same year Afghanistan was loaned another US\$ 100 million for development and a ten year extension on the treaty of neutrality and non-aggression. On the military side, the Soviets and their allies provided US\$ 25 million worth of military materials in 1955 and constructed three military airfields.<sup>45</sup>

The United States on the other hand was reluctant to provide military aid, although they did train a few Afghan officers. The United States continued their low-level aid in the form of the Hilmund Valley Project, Qandahar International Airport, and help with Ariana Afghan Airlines.<sup>46</sup> This stance was in large part due to the United States - Pakistan relationship and the unwillingness of the United States to jeopardize it.

The similarities between United States and Soviet involvement in Somalia and Afghanistan is obvious. In both countries the Soviet Union stepped in with military and nonmilitary aid to the fledgling governments. They sweetened their friendship with large grants and loans with long easy repayment for development projects, especially those that would enhance the capability to disseminate Socialist propaganda in the future, these consisted of high visibility projects in the major cities.

The United States was more cautious with its support of Somalia and Afghanistan. They were not forthcoming with military aid and chose to train Afghan officers and the Somali police force, rather than the military. The aid offered was in the form of specific

projects aimed more at economic aspects than at building the new governments into democracies since the projects, especially in Afghanistan, were under the auspices of the United Nations. The U.S. was already involved with Ethiopia and Pakistan in the respective regions. This involvement caused the U.S. to withhold the military aid that forced the Somalis and Afghans to seeking it elsewhere.

The United States repeatedly rejected Afghan appeals for arms in favor of supplying Pakistan who was a member of the Central Treaty Organization with Britain, Turkey, Iraq, Iran. Washington never saw the strategic importance of preserving Afghanistan as a buffer state as the British had. The Soviets decided to treat Afghanistan as a test area to see to what extent the United States was prepared to compete under pressure in a non-aligned Third World country.<sup>47</sup>

## 7. THE CIVIL WAR PERIOD

### 7.1 The Roots of Social Discontent

The roots of discontent lie primarily in the tribal/clan/ethnic divisions that the people identify with and cling to, and the discontent grows with every hint of favoritism of one group over another. Secondary sources of discontent lie in differences or inequalities, perceived or real, among the people of these countries. These differences include ethnic, religious, and resource distribution.

War and feuding occur frequently in arid environments where overgrazing is common and human and stock populations compete heavily on sparse grazing and water

resources. It is a characteristic of nomadic pastoral life to have frequent strife between lineages and it is not easily controlled when the population is constantly on the move and widely dispersed over a large area. The nomad's access to weapons and vehicles only increases his capability to expand the feud.

In addition to the fighting between nomadic pastoral clans the struggle extends into other areas such as trade where the groups compete for licenses and public service jobs and political appointments. Kin relationships and competition is tied into almost every aspect of economic, political and social life.<sup>48</sup> Also involved in the economic side is the conflict caused by camels, the highest form of wealth in Somali pastoral society because of their usefulness and contribution to the nomad's basic survival. The looting of camels is not an illegal act, but rather an achievement deserving of honor and pride. So, this looting and the skirmishes over water and grazing for the camels and other herds has a very long history. "Cooperation between camel herders is needed in the pastoral society in order to defend one group's camels against the raids of another group. Therefore, for mutual benefit, strong ties between relatives and clan members must exist."<sup>49</sup>

In Afghanistan's Southwestern Plateau tribal feuding centered on grazing rights and watering holes, too. In other regions blood ties, kinship and tribal affiliations have a hold on local economies and hold power over social positions. "Family ties among elites and their overlapping participation in tribal, religious and social networks further promoted their integration into the power arrangements at the top. The ruling

establishment of Afghanistan wanted to preserve the lopsided distribution of power and privileges in society which come through affiliations rather than personal achievement."<sup>50</sup>

The tradition of clan and tribal affiliations inspires internal, at the national level, conflict and works in opposition to a united nation as, logically, the head of the government can be of only one tribe. As long as the national leader can be totally impartial and maintain a strong government enabling agriculture and commerce to be maintained, the citizens will be satisfied. However, if the president selects a greater number of government officials from one tribe than another, if one area receives a larger share of money for any type of development, if the police force or military has a larger percentage of members from one clan than the others; any small advantage of one clan or tribe will be blown totally out of proportion among the others and discontent and mutiny will brew. This difference does not have to actually exist, it can be a matter of perception, the result is the same. In the nation of Somalia, the catalyst was the dictatorship regime of Siyad Barre.

The president of Somalia in 1969 was Shermarke, a member of the Darud clan and his prime minister was Igal, a member of the Ishaq clan. On October 15 Shermarke was killed by one of his bodyguards and on the 21st a military coup deposed the civilian government. Siyad Barre was installed as president by the new government, the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC). The SRC arrested Igal, banned political parties, abolished the National Assembly, and suspended the constitution.

The main goal of the new regime was to abolish tribalism, nepotism, corruption and misrule.<sup>51</sup> The uniform civil code they introduced in 1973 imposed restrictions on the Shari'a courts and eliminated clan blood money payments. They broke up the old regions into smaller units in an effort to destroy the established clan assemblies, and under Soviet direction they set-up the National Security Service (NSS), to "counteract attempts to settle clan disputes through traditional means."<sup>52</sup> Barre denounced clans as obstructing development and national unity in Somalia.

The NSS gave prison sentences for activities described as "clannish" and through propaganda forced community identification rather than lineage on the people. They resettled 140,000 nomadic herders in farming communities and coastal towns and told them to fish and farm. Everything that Barre and his regime did to inspire nationalism went against centuries of traditional clan affiliation. "For generations, the single most important factor in Somali society was the clan and loyalty to it."<sup>53</sup>

Under this Soviet-inspired socialist regime, Somalia's problems were compounded when the clans systems was not allowed to act on its customary laws to help minimize the friction between clans.<sup>54</sup> Barre was a Marrehan, his mother was Ogadeen and his son-in-law was Dulbahante. Even though the Barre regime was a common enemy for many tribes of Soamlis, the regimes actions did not completely unite the clans/tribes against it, similarly the Soviet invasion did not totally unite the tribes of Afghanistan against the Soviet forces. Both the Barre socialist regime and the Soviet presence seemed to act more like fuel for the growing civil tension rather than a common enemy.

Barre's regime attacked the clan-based framework that all Somali society was built on. He stressed that by accepting socialism and nationalism the Somalis would enjoy a better standard of living. It would no longer be necessary to engage in a nomadic lifestyle. Delusional with power and brainwashed by the Soviets, he refused to accept that to the Somali people's loyalty to their kin was infinitely more important than the possession of wealth or personal gain of any kind.<sup>55</sup> A final factor dictating Barre's failure were his acts of favoritism.

In 1975, ten of the twenty members of the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) were from the Darud clan, of which Barre's MOD government (Mareehan, Ogadeen, and Dulbahante) were all part.<sup>56</sup> The Digil and Rahanwayn were totally unrepresented. In 1977, Barre led a war against Ethiopia to achieve self-determination for the Ogaden region which his clansmen the Ogadeen inhabit. His regime gained popularity with the first few victories of the Western Somalia Liberation Force. Many of the Somalis were directly involved in the fighting and many more indirectly and that brought about a small degree of nationalism.<sup>57</sup>

When the war was lost nationalism was replaced with depression and organized opposition groups emerged. The Ishaq clan formed the political opposition group the Somali National Movement (SNM), the United Somali Congress (USC) was formed in central Somalia by the Hawiye clan and the Somali Democratic Movement (SDM) was formed in the south by the Rahanwein clan. "These movements loathed each other almost as much as they did Barre."<sup>58</sup> Then as his popularity declined, instead of devising ways to



defuse his opposition, Barre reacted with repression and a concentration of power into the hands of his family, the very thing he had spoken out against when he first came to power.

Siyad Barre, the great champion of nationalism and socialism, returned to his clannish roots. Barre terrorized the Majeerteen, the Hawiye, and the Ishaq through his Red Berets, an elite group from his own Mareehan clansmen.<sup>59</sup> A great miscalculation was his assault on the Hawiye clan in the late 1980's. The capital of Muqadishyu, his stronghold, became enemy territory with Hawiye snipers firing at him and he retaliated by massacring civilians. When Barre and his supporters finally fled Muqadishyu on January 27, 1991, the Somalis were without a government, out of the frying pan and into the fire.<sup>60</sup>

The Siyad Barre regime of oppression and enforced socialism acted on the divided clans of Somalia in much the same way that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan fueled the feuding between the tribes. In November and December of 1979 the Soviet military began deploying along its border with Afghanistan. By December seventh one regiment was already deployed and by the 21st through the 23rd another was in place. Three others moved as the main force on December 26-28. The Soviets expected an Afghan rebellion and came armed with antiaircraft missiles and rocket battalions.

As they had in Czechoslovakia, the Soviets told the Afghans that the deployments were a military exercise. The Afghan army was ordered to perform maintenance on vehicles and turn in their live ammunition for blanks in keeping with the training exercise, but some units refused to comply.<sup>61</sup>

During the early days of the occupation the Soviets, numbering about 40,000, limited aggression to exactly what was needed to maintain control of key locations in Afghanistan. Only a few months after the invasion started the Soviets began to be harassed by major guerrilla activities and reacted by sending division-sized forces into the Panjsher Valley, Jalalabad, and Herat in 1980.

A major Soviet problem was the use of motorized rifle divisions from the reservist-manned Turkestan Military District. The reservists had ethnolinguistic ties with the Afghan soldiers and guerilla forces and continually fraternized with them, especially the Tajiks.<sup>62</sup> The irregular Afghan forces that fought against the Soviets were referred to as *mujahidin* or "ones who fight a holy war". They thought of themselves in this way because they were fighting for Islam against the atheistic assertions of the communists. During the war these *mujahidin* had seven recognized political parties headquartered in Pakistan and each party had a leader. Of the seven, four could be classified as fundamentalists and the other three as moderates. They were referred to as the Parties or the Party Leaders.<sup>63</sup>

Mohammad Yousaf, author of *The Bear Trap*, was an infantry brigadier in the Pakistan Army suddenly assigned in October 1983 to take over the Afghan Bureau of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) not gathering intelligence, but planning and executing guerilla operations against the Soviets. Yousaf was constantly worried about the feuding between the Parties and their commanders in the field.

Inter-ethnic rivalries were at the root of most of Afghanistan's problems and the Soviets made concerted efforts to exploit the traditional rivalries between the Pashtuns, Uzbeks, and Tajiks.<sup>64</sup> Even united against the common Soviet enemy, the fragmented Afghan society remained divided. Tribesmen of some areas transferred their allegiances between the Soviet-installed puppet government, the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) and the resistance guerrillas regularly on a cash basis. The PDPA would make regular visits to the tribal leaders to buy their allegiance against the *mujahidin*. The PDPA's pacification strategy also exploited conflicts within and between *qawms* to win some traditional leaders to the government side. A subtle and extremely varied combination of psychological pressures, economic inducements, subversion, indoctrination, bribery and manipulation of various tribal and ethnic groups were used in the old British "divide and conquer" maxim.<sup>65</sup>

The dominance of the Islamic leaders in the resistance and the links between the *mujahidin* and the Parties promoted rivalries. Khans clashed with khans and with other classes of leaders such as religious figures or Islamic intellectuals. According to the traditional rules of competition, the khans were sometimes forced to join resistance parties in conflict with those that rivals joined, and sometimes even supporting the government to get military and financial resources.<sup>66</sup>

Many tribal groups in the resistance also decided it was easier to raid the supply trains of other guerrillas than to actually fight the Soviet army.<sup>67</sup> These tribal militias whose loyalty was often bought by the PDPA, operated under the auspices of the Ministry

of Nationalities and Tribal Affairs. One of the PDPA's prestigious and influential party secretaryships was given to Najib Allah, who was also the director of the KHAD (a KGB-like organization) in the mid-1980's, later he would become President. The appointment was a reward for his efficiency and ruthlessness as director of the secret police.<sup>68</sup>

Amnesty International reported in December 1984 that the KHAD used a systematic manner of physical and psychological torture including an October 1984 house-to-house search in which children were taken from their parents and held under water until their parents divulged information about the resistance movement.<sup>69</sup> Najib Allah's KHAD agents also infiltrated *mujahidin* tribal camps and spread false rumors to cause internal conflicts and fighting so efforts at joining forces against the Soviets and the PDPA regime would be ineffective.<sup>70</sup>

The socialist regime of Siyad Barre and the communistic government of the PDPA and invasion of the Soviet army should have united the civil factions of Somalia and Afghanistan giving them a common enemy. However, the rivalry for leadership of opposition forces, control of booty, resources, and territory kept them apart. The tribes/clans of Afghanistan and Somalia did fight against their oppressive governments and foreign interference, but they continued to fight among themselves.

The repression of civic freedoms also played a major role in the unrest that caused civil warring. The Somalia scientific socialism plan declared that Islam had become a capitalistic tool used by the rich and powerful. According to the plan, the Islamic leaders in Somalia should leave all secular matters to the government who would be completely

fair. Religious leaders were arrested for counterrevolutionary activities and members of religious tribunals were dismissed for incompetence and corruption. The people were only permitted to buy the necessary and very expensive passports to travel to Saudi Arabia for *haji*, if they traveled all the way to Muqadishyu, the location of the only office that issued them.<sup>71</sup> Barre criticized the method of teaching in Qu'ranic schools and again stressed that religion belonged in the private sphere, and that religious leaders should not concern themselves with political and economic matters.<sup>72</sup>

For the Somali people faith in Allah and Islam makes their life in a harsh land more bearable. When disasters came, such as the draught of the early 1990's, the Muslims believed that it was Allah's punishment for sins that have caused them to stray from the path of truth. The only way to regain His favor is to repent and rededicate society according to divine precepts. When Barre and his Scientific Socialism attacked the comprehensive role of Islam in their society a militant, Islamic feeling (fundamentalism) was kindled within the people. For example, SRC's Family Act of 1974 and its emancipation of women outraged the *Waddad* (Somali Ulama) and was proof that the regime was interfering in spiritually governed areas of Somali life.<sup>73</sup>

Religion was not the only freedom guaranteed the people in Barre's constitution, but made subject to his interpretation and conditions. The freedoms of speech, expression and association were subject to the condition that exercise of these rights did not contravene the constitution, the laws, the government, morality or public order.<sup>74</sup> Under

the constitution, the government controlled the press and all foreign publications were subject to censorship, and the right of assembly was revoked. This effectively removed the freedom of expression, and caused the cessation of the publication of the nine privately owned newspapers.<sup>75</sup>

In Afghanistan, religious and civil freedoms were taken away in a much more violent manner. On Friday, April 20, 1979, a Muslim Sabbath, tanks rolled into Kermala and massacred 1170 unarmed males in a field on the edge of the town. After the attack some members of the government forces violated the mosque by entering it and tearing away the women's veils to discover three or four more men in hiding. They were dragged to the field and added to the carnage.<sup>76</sup> Communist militants accompanying the troops also burned religious books, tore off women's veils and mocked villagers at prayer asking them if they were "doing sports?"<sup>77</sup>

The traditional green stripe of Islam was removed from the Afghanistan flag in October 1978 and it was made all red like a Soviet state and the government began omitting the traditional "In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate" from the beginning of its decrees.<sup>78</sup> During 1981, an amendment was added to the land reform decree that stated ownership of land was a privilege that the state would grant only in return for allegiance.<sup>79</sup>

The repression of freedoms in Afghanistan was not executed in the same fashion as Somalia; in Afghanistan it consisted of long confinement in prisons, torture and massacre. "A million Afghans are all that should remain alive--a million communists. The rest we

don't need. We'll get rid of all of them,... " said Sayyid 'Abd Allah, Khalqi commander of Pul-e-charkhi prison in Kabul.<sup>80</sup> The PDPA and their Soviet advisers were not really concerned with curtailing the freedom of speech, assembly, press or religion. Any dissent was dealt with harshly.

The interference of the United States and the Soviet Union in Somalia from October 21, 1969 to the present and in Afghanistan from April 27, 1978, to the present was considerable. As was stated previously, the Soviet Union established early links in both countries. The Soviets were quick to send military assistance when the U.S. was hesitant and confined its help to economic aid. The interference that caused the most unrest among the people in Afghanistan and in Somalia is the resource that made their internal fighting more lethal. Mohamed Sahnoun was the UN special representative in Somalia in 1992. In his book, *Missed Opportunities*, he states that aggravating factors in civil unrest such as a ready arms supply often compounds and ignites conflict and war.<sup>81</sup>

This being the case, both the Soviets and the U.S. were guilty of adding a great deal of fuel to the internal fires burning in Somalia and Afghanistan. Between the time Siyad Barre embraced scientific socialism and 1976 Somali-Soviet relations thrived. The Soviet Union shipped numerous sophisticated weapons systems, including MiG-21 jet fighters, T-54 tanks, a SAM-2 missile defense system for Muqadishyu, modern torpedo and missile-armed fast attack and landing craft. The Soviets sent about 1500 military advisers to train and organize the intelligence organization and the NSS. About 2400 Somali military personnel had been trained in the Soviet Union. Egypt, Saudi Arabia,

Iraq, Iran, Kuwait and Jordan also provided Somalia with money or Soviet equipment, arms and ammunition.

Once it was clear that the Soviets had switched their help to Ethiopia, The United States stepped in with \$40 million in military equipment including three TPS-43 long range air defense radars, twelve M-167 towed Vulcan 20mm air defense guns, communications gear, spare parts and training. In 1982 U.S. sales and gifts totaled \$14.3 million worth of anti-tank weapons, radars, air defense guns, small arms and ammunition. In 1983 military aid from the U.S. totaled \$21.2 million. In 1984 it totaled \$24.3 million. In 1985 it reached \$80 million and included many air-transportable 155mm M-198s. In 1986 the total was \$40 million and in 1987 \$37.1 million. During this same period the U.S. trained 126 Somali military personnel at an additional cost of \$2.31 million. In 1988 the U.S. provided \$1.4 million worth of military equipment: 1200 M16 automatic rifles, 2 million rounds of M16 ammunition, 300,000 rounds of 30-caliber ammunition, and 500,000 rounds of 50-caliber ammunition.<sup>82</sup>

Sahnoun figured that during the Carter and Reagan administrations, Somalia received hundreds of millions of dollars in military assistance.<sup>83</sup> It was estimated that more than 40,000 weapons had been abandoned by the Somali Army of the Barre regime alone. With these easily available weapons and ammunition, looting became a major concern.<sup>84</sup> UNOSOM II maintained control over the stockpiles of heavy weapons with the intent of transferring them to a newly organized national army until their withdrawal in March 1995, at which time the weapons were abandoned.<sup>85</sup>



The U.S. State Department finally suspended further military assistance in 1988, when the House Foreign Affairs Committee pressured them because of the Barre regimes violations against human rights and civil liberties. However, in reality military support materials continued to be delivered through mid-1989.<sup>86</sup> When the U.S. dropped out, the slack was picked up by Italy, West Germany, China and Libya who all supplied Somalia with military arms. It is small wonder then that the warring factions today continue to resupply themselves from the vast stockpiles of arms supplied to them.

The Soviet Union first began to supply Afghanistan with arms and military equipment in 1955. The shipment of the equivalent of US\$25 million worth of military materials were provided along with the construction of three military airfields. In August 1956, Afghanistan received US\$25 million in jet airplanes, tanks, and heavy and light weaponry and in October 1956, an IL-14, twelve MiG-15s and a few helicopters. By 1964, Afghanistan possessed 100 Soviet T-34 and T-54 tanks and one hundred aircraft including helicopters, IL-28 bombers and MiG-17 fighters. In 1975, Daud arranged for an additional three hundred T-54/55 medium tanks, more than fifty T-34 tanks, ninety 37mm antiaircraft guns, thirty 120mm mortars, SAMs, thirty-six MiG-17 Fresco-C fighters and spare parts. Daud was a shrewd leader, to the chagrin of both the PDPA and the Soviet Union he started edging closer to the Shah of Iran and managed to secure US\$ 1 billion in aid in 1974 and after the coup another US\$ 2 billion from Iran. He also managed \$40 million in aid from the United States.<sup>87</sup> These agreements really fueled the fires of discontent in Afghanistan.

By 1977, the Soviet Union had provided the equivalent of about US\$600 million in military equipment and trained 3700 officers and non-commissioned officers in the Soviet Union.<sup>88</sup> Just before the Soviets pulled out in 1989 they brought Scud missiles and built up the arms supply by pouring munitions and equipment into the Afghanistan government forces. It is estimated that the first six months of 1989, saw the transfer of US\$1.5 billion of military support including the Scud surface-to surface missiles and in addition to the 1000 tanks they transferred in 1988.<sup>89</sup>

The U.S. military aid to the *mujahidin* did not begin until 1980 after the Soviet invasion. They began with \$30 million in 1980 and steadily increased that amount through the war such that in the last year it amounted to over \$600 million per year. Some of that military aid came in Soviet-style weapons purchased by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency from Egypt, China and Israel which had captured a large cache of Soviet-made weapons during their offensive in Lebanon.<sup>90</sup> Included in the military supplies were more than 30,000 rockets, thousands of mortar bombs, millions of rounds of small-arms ammunition, countless anti-tank mines, and recoilless rifle ammunition.<sup>91</sup> Additional US aid was provided in exorbitant transportation costs to move supplies from Pakistan to Afghanistan and Stinger SAM missiles.<sup>92</sup>

Muhammad Yousaf, the ISI commander states, "The *Mujahidin* could achieve nothing without financial support. No matter how brilliant the strategy might be, the implementation depended on the availability of a vast reservoir of cash with which to arm, train, and move my forces. Almost half of this money originated from the US taxpayer."<sup>93</sup>

## 7.2 The Goals of the Civil War

The goals of the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP) and the Siyad Barre regime were sedentarization and de-tribalization. The SRSP saw the 1974 drought as the golden opportunity to achieve these aims. Both involved the movement of people to new locations hundreds of miles away from their traditional grazing area and their settlement among clans and lineages where they had connections.<sup>94</sup> Barre also wanted to give the people a modern revolutionary education to restructure their social existence. He saw it as the way to eradicate social fragmentation into tribes and sects and the means to bring about absolute unity with no room for foreign cultural influences. The inter-related goals of modernization, nationalism, and independence were all combined in a modern integrated nation comprised not only of those who speak the same language, but also read and write it.<sup>95</sup>

In the case of the PDPA, their manifesto called for the redistribution of land, ethnic equality, emancipation of women, and education for everyone. Their biggest problem was adapting Islam to the atheistic Marxist-Leninist principles their secret constitution was based on.<sup>96</sup> In the beginning they kept their ideology secret, but after a few months they increasingly quoted Marxist-Leninist rhetoric, praised the Soviet system and indirectly attacked Islam, and Afghan traditions.<sup>97</sup> In their first conference since 1965 in September of 1982, the PDPA committed themselves to lower unemployment and build new factories, provide land, water, and education for the peasantry, bring equality for

minorities and respect Islam. The final two goals of the conference when put side-by-side in the context of such incidents as the massacre at Kermala are laughable: to safeguard human rights and to bring about tranquility by the efforts of the armed forces.<sup>98</sup> It is important to remember that the Kermala massacre happened in 1979, three years before the PDPA conference.

The goal of the groups opposed to the Barre Regime in Somalia and the PDPA government in Afghanistan was to overthrow the incumbent government. All the opposition groups primarily sought relief from the repression and oppression that they faced at the hands of their government.

The only effective break with Barre and Somali clanism was achieved by the Somali National Movement (SNM), a primarily Ishaq-clan group in northern Somalia. Beginning in 1980 the SNM coordinated among the northern tribes and outlined its goals as combining "the advantages of Somali democracy and egalitarianism with the benefits of modern national government." A system which would attempt to instill a sense of nationalism in the presently tribal centered social life. This effort would revolve around decentralized regional governments rather than a unitary state. The country would be divided into regions, each having a government with an elected governor responsible for police, public health and sanitation, utilities, roads, transportation, agriculture, pastoral development, and agriculture. The central government would control national defense, foreign and financial policies, and national development and its power would be clearly

divided between executive, legislative, and judicial. The goal: to overcome clanism without destroying Somali society.<sup>99</sup>

The result of this coordination was made evident when on 18 May 1991, the SNM proclaimed the rebirth of the Somaliland Republic. In the spring of 1993 a new central government was elected which had the support of the people. The Somaliland Republic is at peace as compared with, "the heavy-handed and largely unsuccessful UN and other international efforts to impose peace from the top in southern Somalia, this was an impressive testimony to the effectiveness of traditional grass-roots Somali diplomacy."<sup>100</sup>

The other Somali political parties are: the United Somali Congress created by the Hawiye clan and now divided between the 'Ali Mahdi faction and the Mohammad Farah Aydid faction in southern Somalia in and around Muqadishyu, the Somali Salvation Democratic Front created by the Majeerteen subclan of Darud in northeaster Somalia, the Somali National Front organized by the Mareehan subclan of the Darud in southern Somalia on the Kenya border, the Somali Patriotic Front founded by the Ogadeen another subclan of Darud from both southern and central Somalia now also split into two factions, the Somali Democratic Movement is of the Rahanwein clan split in two factions from southern and western Somalia, and the Somali Democratic Association is the party of the Dir clan living in northwestern Somalia or the Somaliland Republic.

There are also numerous smaller parties as well as coalitions of parties presently operating in Somali seeking their own solutions to their own agenda or, in simpler words, they fight for the majority of power, position, resources, and wealth for their

subclan/clan.<sup>101</sup> The political faction party leaders or warlords use the poor situation of their country to extract international free support which then is used for the benefit of their personal family and clan.<sup>102</sup> In the last true elections held in Somalia, more than eighty political parties registered to compete for parliamentary seats, almost each Somali subclan had its own political party.<sup>103</sup>

The Afghan tribes/political parties fighting for supremacy currently are: the Islamic Society of Afghanistan, the Islamic Party-Hekmatyar faction, the Islamic Party-Khalis faction, the Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan, the Islamic Revolutionary Movement, the Afghanistan National Liberation Front, the National Islamic Front, the National Islamic Unity Party, the Islamic Movement, and the National Islamic Movement.

It would appear that for nine out of the ten parties, the return to Islamic principles in varying degrees is a prime objective or they may be invoking Islam simply to rally more support both from the people and the religious leadership. All these parties continue to fight against the government in Kabul led by President Burhan al-Din Rabbani of the Islamic Society.<sup>104</sup> The Islamic Society of Afghanistan or *Jami 'at*, lead by Rabbani wants a fundamentalist Islamic state and is more tolerant than other radical *mujahidin* parties. The government's power is currently being shared by Rabbani and Mas'ud.

Hekmatyar, another "man that would be king" is most noted for his enterprising during the war. According to Larry Lambert, Hekmatyar has gone beyond selling raw opium in the bazaars and invested in a processing plant for the production and marketing

of opium and heroin products.<sup>105</sup> The government structure at present is in a state of flux. The Prime Minister is Hekmatyar, the leader of the Islamic Party-Hekmatyar faction, does not carry out the duties of his office and is currently aligned with Dostum in the northwest. The Islamic Party-Hekmatyar faction is radically fundamentalist. Their primary objective is to establish a one-party Islamic state similar to Iran. They reject Western values and ideas and want strong relations and solidarity with the Muslim world. They are the most xenophobic, intolerant, and least cooperative.<sup>106</sup> The Islamic Party-Khalis faction as of 1991 was led by Muhammad Khalis. It is also fundamentalist and favors a more liberal association with the West as long as the government is an Islamic state. Khalis is anti-communist.

The Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan was founded by 'Abd al-Sayyaf and is a radical Islamist movement with its stated objective of an Afghanistan with an Islamic government. Has been accused of being intimate with the "Wahhabi" *mujahidin*, and gets much support from the Gulf States.<sup>107</sup> The Islamic Revolutionary Movement wants to establish democratic government and retain many features of the Afghan traditional society, to hold free elections after the political situation is normalized, to make agriculture reforms, to maintain international non-alignment. The National Islamic Front for Afghanistan or *Milli-Islami* is the most moderate group wants to create an elected and free government with separate executive, legislative, and judicial branches.

The Afghan National Liberation Front is favorable toward relations with the West and desires a representative government based on Islamic principles, Afghan traditions,

and democracy. The Front is one of the seven resistance organizations allowed to operate out of Pakistan and is led by Professor Mujaddidi. The National Islamic Front is led by Pir Gailani and is another of the seven permitted by Pakistan. Founded in 1979, the group advocates an elected but Islamic government. The National Islamic Unity Party is led by the poet Khalili and had the newspaper *Wahdat* as its mouthpiece. It espoused the objectives of peaceful coexistence, equal rights for women, and the revival of Afghan culture.<sup>108</sup>

The Islamic Movement is part of the Shi'ah Alliance, is led by a moderate who receives no funding from Iran, Ayat Allah Muhsini.<sup>109</sup> It has broken into fundamentalist and moderate factions. The *Hizb Allah (Hezbollah)*, or Party of God is a Shiite group with Iranian ties. The Shura advocates an autonomous Hazara region.

The National Islamic Movement is a Sunni group fighting to establish a federated state with Uzbek autonomy. The National Islamic Movement is led by Dostum who is an ethnic Uzbek and a military officer. He was a communist leader who commanded 40,000 men and at the end of the war he formed his new party with his followers and was consolidated under the umbrella organization *Hizb-i-Wahadat* (Unity Party).<sup>110</sup>

The Taliban movement in the south and west is expanding to the rest of the country and the tribes outside the fortifications around Kabul do not recognize any government at all.<sup>111</sup> It is unclear whether the Taliban movement is a military, semi-political force trained and funded by Pakistan, or a group of ordinary Afghans who are disgusted with corrupt warlords and politicians. Nancy Dewolf Smith, features editor of



*The Asian Wall Street Journal*, wrote in her 22 February 1995 column that after having lunch with a group of Taliban members, she is certain that they are the "best thing that ever happened to Afghanistan and the country's last chance." On 30 May 1995, the Voice of America reported that a mass grave containing twenty-two male bodies was unearthed south of Kabul and local inhabitants say they were executed by the Taliban Islamic Student Movement.

S. K. Singh of *The Hindustan Times*, states that the Taliban militia are self-proclaimed, Pakistan supported, students winning their way across Afghanistan by large cash payoffs to local tribal commanders and governors. Taliban supporters allowed General Babar and a large group of Pakistani officials to drive from Quetta to Qandahar to Herat and back, and the Taliban have not attempted any encroachments against areas or forces under the control of pro-Saudi commanders. *The San Francisco Chronicle*, reported on 20 March 1995, that the Islamic Taliban lost its reputation as the potential peacemakers of war-ravaged Afghanistan when they launched an assault of rockets and heavy artillery on the capital city of Kabul. "People used to embrace them...now they're just another group of warriors." *The Chronicle* considers the militia to be made up of volunteers schooled in the Islamic education centers of Pakistan that until the bombing of Kabul had swept the countryside disarming warlords, burning opium poppy fields and drug laboratories and bringing peace. Only time will tell who the Taliban pay their allegiance to and what their agenda is.<sup>112</sup>

The United States is represented in Somalia by three entities: Officials and soldiers of the US government, personnel of the United Nations, and representatives of civil US relief organizations. The objectives of the United States government in Somalia grew out of its desire to increase its presence in the Indian Ocean-Persian Gulf region after their friend the Shah of Iran fell from power in 1979. The U.S. was amazed at how fast the Soviets reacted to the Ethiopian-Somali war and military strategists wondered about our ability to wage conventional war, consequently they came up with the idea of a Rapid Deployment Force. The US became convinced that the Soviet naval base in Berbera was indispensable to our force projection in the area.

Washington D.C. and Muqadishyu signed an agreement allowing the U.S. armed forces access to Somali ports and airfields in Muqadishyu, Berbera, and Kismayu. With the end of the Cold War, the U.S. increased its humanitarian aid to Somalia by \$19 million, but saw no reason to become involved in the political conflict because the military facility at Berbera had turned out to be completely unnecessary for the Desert Shield deployment.<sup>113</sup> However, later in the civil war, during 1993, the objective of the US government became the perceived need to intervene in the unrest and put a stop to the famine sweeping the nation as portrayed on the evening news.

The political agenda of President Clinton dictated that he send military forces into Somalia to capture General Muhammad Farah Aydid, the dominant political figure and in Clinton terms, a warlord. The American people were largely behind the move, seeing starving children on the evening news was upsetting. It was the United States

governments objective to seize Aydid and place him aboard a ship off the coast of Somalia where he would be tried by a panel of American judges.

Within days of the Special Operations team deployment Secretary of Defense Les Aspin in August announced a tougher line against Aydid and the warlords. US forces would remain in Somalia until all factions were disarmed and the violence had ceased. After the October 3rd massacre of US armed forces on the Special Operations team the US government's objectives changed yet again to abandon the hunt for Aydid, do not be photographed at memorial services for the dead servicemen since those pictures could be shown during re-election time, and hope the country forgets about the grossly mistaken, strictly political policy decisions.<sup>114</sup>

The goals of the United Nations involvement in the Somali civil war are very clearly stated and repeated in twelve resolutions over a two and a half year period from January 1992 to May 1994 (UN Resolution Numbers 733 to 923). Each resolution states the same objectives with a few variations in the wording: to restore peace in Somalia and deliver humanitarian aid. The objective of delivering humanitarian aid also provides certain aid organizations the justification for their continued presence and fund raising activities. Those employed in delivering aid have a vested interest in continued crisis to justify jobs for administration level members within their organizations. Examples are USAID and Food for Peace.<sup>115</sup>

The USAID FY 1996 funding request for Somalia exceeds \$5 million to support ongoing aid projects, and humanitarian aid organizations reported that conditions within

the country have "markedly improved", people were returning to the communities, above-average rains had fallen, there was a low risk of famine, an established base for rehabilitation and development existed, as did the capability for a significant cereal crop.<sup>116</sup> Suddenly on February 22, 1996, UN Security Council President Madeleine Albright reported in a Reuters news release that something had better be done on the humanitarian side because Somalia was "on the verge of becoming as bad as it was before." Which statement was accurate?

The United States relief organizations have a similar objective to that of the UN organizations but more encompassing. The U.S. organizations want to deliver humanitarian aid to Somalia and Afghanistan but without paying proper consideration for the immediate impacts or long term effects. These agencies continuously search for and find emergencies, sometimes where none actually exist, and then dictate the amount of humanitarian aid needed thereby positively affecting their income. Michael Maren a worker in Somalia with the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) calls USAID, "the major leagues in the relief business" since 1981. He is the author of "How the Culture of Aid Gave Us the Tragedy of Somalia" *The Village Voice*, 19 January 1993.

His article decries the actions of the relief business.

Aid is a business. It is a business in which people make careers, earn a good living, get to see interesting places and have great stories to tell when they get stateside. Its a business that has to earn money to pay its executives, pay for retreats and for officials to attend conferences in Rome, buy 4-wheel drive vehicles, pay for airfare, and buy advertising time on television. Its a business that makes

money by attracting clients, i.e. starving needy people. These agencies, called PVOs or private voluntary agencies, (NGOs by the UN---non-governmental organizations) raise a lot of money from the public, but get most of it from the U.S. government.

Essentially, they cook up projects and write project proposals looking for funding. When the funding is approved... they hire people to run the project. They'll need administrators in New York or wherever they're based, and project managers and a couple more trucks or whatever. Every project means an expansion of the agency. The bigger the agency the more power the people at the top have, the more people they can claim to be helping, and the more money they can raise from the public.

All of the PVO's get food from the U.S. government, and with each ton of food they get to distribute, they get the money to move it and administer it. Naturally, they're always looking to get more food and more money so they can say they're saving more people.

Letting CARE tell the government how many starving people need to be fed in Somalia is like letting Northrop tell the Air Force how many B-1 bombers it needs.

And while photogenic famines are great for raising money, most PVO projects are not in famine areas. They are in regions of Africa, Asia, and Latin America where there is plenty of food. Nonetheless, a lot of projects involve food, mostly because it is a readily available resource, and one of the best ways to get grant money from USAID.<sup>117</sup>

In the 100-Day Action Program of the United Nations six UN organizations were reported at work in Somalia coordinating overall humanitarian aid: The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), United Nations International Children's Education Fund (UNICEF), the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Food Program (WFP), and the World Health Organization (WHO). In addition, "more

than thirty NGOs were working in Somalia as implementing partners of the United Nations."<sup>118</sup>

With each of the twelve resolutions over the two and a half year period the UN called for humanitarian aid and provided a pretense for all the relief businesses to write their proposals for funding and expand their agencies more. UNOSOM II reported the following administrative costs for their humanitarian efforts over a six-month period: salaries for civilian personnel \$61,680, housing accommodations for civilian personnel \$7,790, management information system \$250, staff assessment \$6,660, transportation for workers \$11,520, and supplies \$38,850. This is the donated money that the relief business uses to administer and distribute the free food and medicines. At the Addis Ababa conference on 11-13 March 1993, the United Nations, the United Nations Agencies (listed above), the International Red Cross, and the thirty NGOs working in Somalia estimated the cost of the humanitarian needs of Somalia at \$166.5 million.<sup>119</sup> That gives the relief businesses of the United States a great deal of money to administer aid and a significant goal in interfering in Somalia.

The Soviet goal came early and was really only important strategically in relation to their Cold War rivalry with the United States. The USSR had been establishing Somalia as a loyal client government for over fifteen years. They had trained and supplied the Somali military at a large cost to them and they had supplied economic and military assistance totaling over US\$250 million. The Soviet fleet had access to the ports of Muqadishyu, Kismayu and Berbera, and Berbera's port was located strategically; directly

across the Gulf of 'Adan from South Yemen who was also a Soviet client. Near the port of Berbera was also the location of one of their nuclear weapon-servicing facilities.<sup>120</sup>

South Yemen also was the location of the only full-scale U.S.-style military base the Soviets had in any Third World country, complete with communications and missile support facilities.<sup>121</sup> They lost everything they had invested when they backed Ethiopia against Siyad Barre in the Ogadeen War. Barre quickly nullified the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation and sent all Soviet military advisers and civilian personnel packing. A few years later the United States was using the ports of Somalia. The Soviets probably would have continued with both Somalia and Ethiopia as client regimes if Barre had not been so determined to have the Ogaden.

In Afghanistan the Soviet goals for their occupation were much the same as for their invasion: they wanted to "preserve a friendly regime that could not survive without substantial armed assistance."<sup>122</sup> Toward that end more than 50,000 young Afghans were sent to the U.S.S.R. for education. "Even if it takes a generation or two, the present administration of Afghanistan will be replaced with appropriately groomed pro-Moscow cadres."<sup>123</sup> The Soviets felt that Hafiz Allah Amin lacked the credibility to unite the factions of the PDPA. The rising power of Islamic movements had the potential of influencing political unrest and upheavals within the Soviet Union's own Central Asian republics.<sup>124</sup>

Brezhnev in 1968, proclaimed the right of the USSR to intervene within any country in Eastern Europe where socialism was in danger from counterrevolutionary

forces. Because of the socialist nature of the Afghan PDPA regime the Soviet leadership decided it represented a significant commitment to the USSR. An added dimension could have been the demonstration for other Warsaw Pact states as to the consequences if they proved unable to control their anti-socialist elements. Soviet intervention in Afghanistan also illustrated the lack of concern they felt for Western criticism when dealing with a country that bordered the Soviet Union.<sup>125</sup>

In an attempt to justify its invasion of Afghanistan the Soviet Union claimed interference by China and the United States, and invoked the Soviet-Afghan friendship treaty of 1955. On 6 January 1980, *Pravda* noted that the international reaction, and in particular US reaction, was severe because US plans to turn Afghanistan into an anti-Soviet military staging ground had been reversed. Brezhnev said it was the threat on their southern border by the Americans and Chinese that made the invasion and occupation of Afghanistan necessary.<sup>126</sup> This of course was propaganda to respond to the reactions of the world including the boycott of the Moscow Olympics, the U.S. grain embargo and the UN demand for an immediate withdrawal of foreign troops. Even when Afghan high school students began to protest and march against the pro-Soviet Afghan military and Soviet advisers the Soviet response was that they were being agitated by the West.<sup>127</sup>

Under the Brezhnev regime the growth of Soviet military power was undeniable. Total manpower increased by a million troops, defense spending increased by US\$70 per man, total warhead weapons increased by 5,600, tanks increased by 15,000, fighter/attack aircraft increased by 1000 and naval combatant ships and submarines increased by 100.<sup>128</sup>



This military build up and the development of new weaponry such as a new AK-74 high velocity rifle with well-designed bullets and image-intensifier, an AKR-Krinko machine gun, an RPG-18 disposable grenade launcher, automatic 81mm mortar bombs, 152mm artillery shells with flechette rounds, MI-24 gunships with SU-25 Frogfoot fighters, the MI-26 transport helicopter, the BMP-2 armored fighting vehicle with 30mm cannon, the BTR-60 armored personnel carrier, and Butterfly anti-personnel landmines.<sup>129</sup> The Soviet Army leaders looked forward to a chance to test this new equipment in action. Afghanistan was that opportunity.

Another short-term objective of the Soviets was the exploitation of Afghanistan's natural resources. The earlier agreements allowed the Soviet Union to purchase needed resources like iron ore, oil, natural gas, coal, and water for irrigation and hydroelectric power at prices well-below world market rates, but with the invasion they were finally able to have complete control over them. Within a year not a single cubic meter out of an annual production of 1.2 billion cubic meters of natural gas was being used in Afghanistan itself, all of it was being piped directly into the U.S.S.R.<sup>130</sup>

Many analysts believe that the long term objectives of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan were that once they were entrenched firmly there, they could extend Soviet influence and control southward to the warm water ports on the Indian Ocean since Pakistan was also an ethnically divided and politically unstable country. The Soviet military would then have a year-round supply and refueling base to move supplies between European Russia and Siberia more quickly and in greater volume than the Trans-Siberian

Railway could accommodate.<sup>131</sup> It would also give them a position of greater influence in the Gulf area that contains 56 percent of the world's known oil reserves.<sup>132</sup>

Red Army Lieutenant General Andrei Yevgen'evich Snesev, a senior commander during the civil war and later chief of the General Staff Academy, in his 1921 book *Afghanistan*, stated that Afghanistan only represented a stop-over on the way to India.<sup>133</sup>

U.S. objectives in Afghanistan were incredibly direct although how they achieved them was definitely circuitous. The primary objective of the United States government in giving hundreds of millions of dollars in military aid to the Afghan *mujahidin*, seems to have been to gain revenge on the Soviet Union for their similar role in Vietnam. The United States wanted to see the Soviets bled by a guerrilla force that they helped finance and supplied with weapons.<sup>134</sup> The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in late 1984, designated \$250 million in fiscal year FY 1985 for the military support of the *mujahidin*. Much of the \$325 million they had given to them in earlier years had never reached the interior of Afghanistan.<sup>135</sup>

U.S. revenge was complete. Letters from the Soviet army home and confiscated by *mujahidin* related tales of alcohol and drug abuse. The Soviet soldiers were looting, charging road tolls, and outright robbery to get money for hashish and cocaine. They even traded with the Afghans on the black market and sold their provisions, weapons and ammunition.<sup>136</sup>

A secondary objective of the United States was a government neither communist or Islamic. This objective was achieved by the withdrawal of finances before the *mujahidin* achieved victory over the Soviet installed government and took power themselves in Kabul and secondarily by the establishment, with input from Pakistan, of the Afghanistan Interim Government so that the *mujahidin* were diverted to fighting among themselves. The U.S. deliberately encouraged old jealousies and ambitions between the Parties and Commanders who after Soviet withdrawal were now thinking about the political futures and positions of authority.<sup>137</sup>

Mohammad Yousaf feels that the Americans were the only winners in the Afghan-Soviet Union war.

### 7.3 The Refugee Problem

The nomads of Afghanistan and Somalia have a long tradition of moving when drought, famine, flood or fighting invades their territory. Many with an Islamic belief that adversity is the will of Allah; punishment meted out for past sins. Over five million people, almost one-third of the entire country's population, moved into neighboring countries when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan and another two to three million moved to different locations within its borders.<sup>138</sup> The 1979 census report lists the population of Kabul at 913,164 people. By mid-1985 reports placed the city at over 2 million.<sup>139</sup> The Somali government under the Barre regime claimed 1.5 million refugees in 1981. Michael

Maren and his friends (aid workers with the Red Cross) estimated about a third of that amount by their head counts at the refugee camps.<sup>140</sup>

In Somalia the international relief community worked overtime. The French private organization *Medecins Sans Frontieres* (MSF) spent almost US\$6 million in 1992 flying in 230 metric tons of unimix dietary supplement each month bought with funds contributed to the MSF by the European Economic Community (EEC) and The U.S. Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA).<sup>141</sup> The World Food Program (WFP) accounted for 18,857 metric tons of donated food from January to July of 1992, and the International Council for the Red Cross (ICRC) administered 53,900 metric tons of donated food February to June, also in 1992. World Health Organization (WHO) and United Nations International Childrens Educational Fund (UNICEF) provided drugs, medical supplies, provided seeds and tools. Saudi Arabia shipped in 4,000 metric tons of food and Nigeria donated 2,000 metric tons of baby food.<sup>142</sup>

In it's 1996 fund report Save The Children foundation reports the expenditure of 2,764,000 British pounds in Somalia for emergency relief and rehabilitation, therapeutic feeding centers and food distribution, mother and child health clinics, care of displaced people, nutritional surveillance, rehabilitation of agriculture and water supplies, management and planning advice to the Ministry of Health. The foundation also spent an additional 296,000 British pounds in the area of Somalia that currently calls itself Somaliland.

Save the Children has also been working in Afghanistan and with Afghan refugees in Pakistan since the mid 1970s. Its expenditures in Afghanistan reached 105,000 British pounds in the form of grants for rebuilding primary schools, teacher training and training in development survey techniques. In a press release dated Thursday March 7, 1996, the foundation announced that it had suspended relief operations in western Afghanistan because the Taliban movement had recently imposed such strict restrictions on Afghan female contact with Westerners that organization workers could not consult with the Afghan women who are the primary caretakers of children. The Save the Children foundation had been training the women to become primary school teachers and rebuilding the Afghanistan schools. Only support of emergency programs such as landmine awareness and landmine removal programs in Afghanistan would continue.

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) also reports that it has suspended its assistance program in Afghanistan because the country's government was a "bad partner" in development.<sup>143</sup> Under U.S. law government funded aid organizations, such as USAID, could no longer function in Afghanistan if the Afghan government would not cease its involvement in drug trafficking.<sup>144</sup> The United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) still assists the Afghan refugees at camps outside Afghanistan's borders.

Many other organizations also have extensive activities among Afghan exiles, but are prevented from working within the country by their mandates.<sup>145</sup> The Cooperative for American Remittances Everywhere (CARE), and several lesser known international aid

organizations such as the International Bureau for Afghanistan in Paris and the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan, who might work in non-government controlled zones of the interior of Afghanistan do not. CARE representatives state that it is "not into clandestine relief."<sup>146</sup>

The repatriation of these Afghan refugees presents further problems. As the millions of Afghans who sought refuge in Pakistan are forced to return, they will find their homes and villages devastated and their fields strewn with millions of unexploded landmines. These difficulties associated with the fact that the civil war continues, intimates that many Afghans will remain in Pakistan since many have opened businesses, built homes, and have their families with them. It will be difficult for the government of Pakistan to evict the Afghans since in some areas they outnumber the Pakistani population and the Afghans are well armed.<sup>147</sup>

Because of the heavy shelling in Kabul during the last few years, nearly 400,000 people are displaced within the city itself, squatting in public buildings or taking refuge with those who still have homes. An estimated 300,000 have taken advantage of the brief cease-fires and have fled to refugee camps near Jalalabad where they are housed in overcrowded tents. Still others have gone to Mazar al-Sharif where camps have also been set up.<sup>148</sup> According to the UNHCR records of nine provinces surveyed each had at least 35 percent of their populations living as refugees in Pakistan.<sup>149</sup>

The problem with the international relief efforts in Somalia and Afghanistan is that centralized aid efforts do not coincide well with the traditional agricultural or nomadic

way of life. This is especially true in the case of Somalia where the quantity of aid has been in the past, and still is, massive and the population is more nomadic than that of Afghanistan. Rural dispersed or nomadic populations make it difficult for leaders to build a modern state. People need to be settled in one location in order for an established government to conduct a census, to tax them, to draft them and to plan for health and educational needs. For the warlords of Somalia and the faction leaders of Afghanistan it is important to consolidate the people in order to collect foreign aid for them.

Nomads spend most of their time searching for food for themselves and their animals. Farmers, in growing food for subsistence and sale. When aid organizations provide food in a location the nomads will hear of it and arrive to take advantage of it. Just as a nomad does in day to day life, he will stay until the food supply runs out then move on in search of more. Farmers have been driven out of business since they cannot compete with the free food offered by the aid organizations. The refugees flock to the camps where food and medical care were available. Lives once spent searching for water holes and raising crops independently, are changed to a parasitic lifestyle of standing in lines for water, food, and medical treatment in a refugee camp.

The local warlord benefits in that while in the camps the refugees can be counted to justify foreign aid appeals. The foreign assistance arrives and is used (given or withheld) to maintain a corrupt warlords power. The relief workers are satisfied because they feel that they are feeding and saving these needy, backward people who couldn't survive without their help. The administration levels of the relief organizations are content

because they have steady wages and are secure in their white collar careers administering the aid. All the while an agricultural, semi-nomadic or nomadic people are becoming dependent on the free food, infected with diseases associated with living in such close contact with so many without adequate sanitation, and their herds and farmland are neglected. Michael Maren describes these effects in his article his *Village Voice* article "The Culture of Aid that Gave Us the Tragedy of Somalia."

Traditionally nomads move when conditions warrant it and despite Somalia's feuding factions the natural conditions within the country have improved during 1995 with the return of above-average rainfall. The Somali nomads are returning from Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti, and the cities in Somalia to their rural farming and herding communities to take advantage of this rain as they have throughout their history.<sup>150</sup> Insufficient rainfall in the Bur Hakaba region had caused much of the farming there to fail in 1995. The farmers have migrated to the banana plantations in the Lower Shabeelle to get temporary jobs until the Buur Hakaba gets rain and is fertile again. This is a typical strategy of nomads coping with drought.<sup>151</sup>

In March of 1995 UNOSOM II followed by many of the international relief organizations left Somalia. The result of the loss of the large funds they made available to the warring factions was to cause the power and control of the faction leaders to be reduced. They no longer had looted aid to distribute to loyal followers. Their followers, many of them nomads, seeing the end of plentiful food and booty quit fighting for the warlords and went home to farm and herd since rain had again fallen. A group of leading



Muqadishyu businessmen seemed to be taking a leading political role using employment as a bargaining chip. Aydid and other faction leaders seeing their power slipping away, put out calls to the ICRC, WFP and other relief organizations in September 1995, for international assistance and the relief groups hurried to answer the call. Within weeks the ICRC declared the fertile Jubba Valley a famine zone.

Immediately the factions renewed their fighting to control the distribution of the arriving food and material assistance. As noted earlier, a USAID FY 1996 funding request for Somalia exceeded \$5 million, but the nongovernment organizations (NGOs) (humanitarian aid organizations) reported conditions within the country had improved with people returning to their communities and a low risk of famine forecast.<sup>152</sup> In contradiction to NGO statements, on 22 February 1996, UN Security Council President Madeleine Albright said something needed to be done on the humanitarian side because Somalia was "on the verge of becoming as bad as it was before."<sup>153</sup>

Unlike Afghanistan and Somalia, the Somaliland Republic received only a minimal amount of humanitarian aid because it was far from Muqadishyu, the central power base and shipping facilities. This region left untainted by foreign donated dollars declared their independence from the rest of Somalia in 1991. This Somaliland Republic has been able to hold inter-clan conferences including elders from its forty clans, and professionals, intellectuals, and modern politicians. In 1993 they elected a president and a bicameral parliament.

Tempers between the Somaliland clans flared temporarily when the UN's acting representative Lansane Kouyte paid the person who had lost the 1993 presidential election to enter an alliance with Aydid, and denounce Somaliland's independence that he himself had declared. Large scale armed fighting erupted in Hargeysa, but since has subsided and the future of the Somaliland Republic looks stable.<sup>154</sup> Why would the UN wish to destabilize a country, and why not recognize a fledgling democracy?

The UN may have attempted this de-stabilization to avoid the precedent of small countries being formed by small disgruntled groups seeking independence, but is the UN in the business of deciding countries boundaries. A simple investigation will show that the Somaliland Republic did exist separate from Somalia until the 1960's. Also worth mentioning are the many new republics struggling to find their way after seeking independence from the former Soviet Union. These former states have been accorded the respect of the international community by at least being recognized as nations.

During the period since 1987 when the repression under Barre's regime began and the subsequent civil warring, about 315,000 Somalis had sought asylum in European countries. Those who sought asylum in Saudi Arabia are not considered or reported as refugees, but considered migrant workers along with Yemenis, Eritreans, Ethiopians, Djiboutis, Sudanese, Pakistanis, Filipinos, and others. The numbers of Somalis in Saudi Arabia is unknown since they are classified as migrant labor. An additional 280,000 Somalis sought refuge in Kenya, some 100,000 in Ethiopia, about 40,000 in Djibouti, and 70,000 in other countries around the world including the United States. These refugees

are hesitant to return to Somalia and are not impressed by peace accords between Aydid and 'Ali Mahdi, or any of the other warlords. They know the inter-clan warring for positions of power and control is ongoing.<sup>155</sup>

The International Office of Migration surveyed camps and in its results released in December 1995 they counted 54,680 Somalis displaced within the country a considerably smaller number than the UNOSOM figure of 250,000. Seventy-five percent of the 54,680 displaced are nomadic herders who are now engaged in subsistence work, trading or scavenging. Most of them would like to return to their homes and the rural economies of their home areas would benefit from their return, but they are hesitant due to civil insecurity and presence of plentiful aid.<sup>156</sup>

The refugee problem has far-reaching effects for the countries involved. The losing country experiences a "brain drain" when many intellectuals and professionals seek asylum in other countries and choose not to return. Many Somalis and Afghans were educated in the United States, Canada, Great Britain, Germany, France and Russia for their professions. Most intended to go back to Afghanistan and Somalia and perform their chosen professions for the betterment of their countries, but when civil war broke out many were forced to remain in or retreat to these stable countries to have a secure home and stable income. Some of them were caught in the process of their foreign education and have never been able to return.

Most refugees from Afghanistan and Somalia reside in countries neighboring their homelands. These countries are experiencing problems of high unemployment, hunger and

malnutrition, and high infant mortality to name a few. The presence of large numbers of refugees in need of food, shelter, education, and jobs can only exacerbate already serious situations in Pakistan and Ethiopia. The presence of the refugees and the burden they exert on an agricultural economy can also lead to resentment and fighting. In Pakistan, many small Pakistani-owned shops were driven out of business by Afghan competition, and the overgrazing as a result of the additional Afghan livestock present caused soil erosion. The concentration of refugees also caused regional deforestation in their quest for wood for construction, cooking, and heat.<sup>157</sup>

If peace were to prevail tomorrow, the current situation in the Horn of Africa does not seem to offer a very promising future for combatants or refugees. Creating the number of jobs that would be needed in the region would be an enormous task. The people must be allowed to return to what the way of life they know as soon as the weather permits. The rehabilitation and employment of the Vietnam War veterans was a major problem for an economically advanced country like the United States. For the combatants in Somalia, the end of the fighting might mean starting from scratch without the free foreign humanitarian aid. For the *mujahidin* guerrillas, fighting is not always a full-time activity. Their numbers of up to 150,000 fluctuates from season to season.<sup>158</sup> In Somalia, too, the anti-Barre forces relied a great deal on rural militia groups. Pastoralists are a traditionally armed people as a measure to protect their herds and grazing areas. The civil war has caused many of them to be "armed to the teeth".<sup>159</sup>

## 8. THE PRESENT CONDITIONS OF CONTINUED CIVIL WAR

### 8.1 Factional Feuding

In both Somalia and Afghanistan the many political factions still fighting to gain control of the governments carry with them their tribal affiliations and religious sectarianism. Some of the political parties want a government based on stricter adherence to Islamic law and tradition. Others wish to have close ties with the West. The factions fight to have the entire nation's population subjected to the desires of their group.

What was in earlier days referred to as a clanship tie, tribal affiliation, an ethnic group, or a *qawm* has been given the modern title of a political party. The political factions may now have a policy and seek government positions, but essentially they are the same factions, recognizing the same tribal affiliations which existed before their respective civil wars erupted. The leaders seek a better way of life for their families and friends, since they are the people the leaders trust: more land, more fertile areas, higher social position, power over other groups, and to ensure their factions religious beliefs are adopted as the national standard.

In Afghanistan the UN envoy has "implore(d) the people to be Afghans first". *New Republican* magazine, 18 May 1992, replies that it's like telling them not to be themselves. The Afghans feel that their tribal affiliations are the only sure links of security they possess in a turbulent country be they Pashtuns, Hazaras, Uzbeks, Tajiks or Turkmen. A modification of the borders might improve conditions or endless civil war and rule by a minority seem to be inevitable.

Fighting does continue presently and the Rabbani/Mas'ud government blames Taliban rebels for carrying out at least four separate air strikes on residential areas of Kabul on November 26th, 1995. The Taliban are rejecting the UN proposal to replace the current government with a multi-factional council in favor of establishing a strict Islamic rule.<sup>160</sup> On January 13, 1996, at least fifteen rockets hit the city wounding fifteen people. The Rabbani/Mas'ud government claimed they were fired by the anti-government Taliban rebels entrenched south of the city. "The Taliban are blamed almost daily by the government for rocket fire and artillery attacks."<sup>161</sup>

The winter in besieged Kabul has been very cold and desolate as more homes are destroyed with each shelling attack. Seeing no near end to the blockade of Kabul the International Commission of the Red Cross (ICRC) began an emergency airlift of food into the city on January 6th. On 28 January 1996, a convoy of trucks carrying much needed food and supplies broke through to Kabul after being cut off for about two weeks, reportedly by elements of the Taliban.

CARE representatives were inside the city providing emergency food and shelter for about 22,000 families and a regular food package for 5,000 widows and disabled.<sup>162</sup> On February 4th two people were killed and eight more wounded when artillery rounds found their targets in Kabul. CNN Internet news releases of 28 January and 4 February estimate 20,000 people have been killed in Kabul alone in the past four years of factional fighting. Estimates of the number of non-combatants killed since the 1978 coup are as high as 500,000.<sup>163</sup>

The situation is no better in Somalia. Since the return of the international relief organizations in September 1995, November saw fighting in southern Somalia in the Lower Jabba Valley region between two subclans of the Hawiye clan: the Galj'els and the Shikhails, leaving several dead and many wounded. The death count was twenty-six when the Abgal and Murusadeh subclans were fighting, their clashes cut the road linking Muqadishyu and Baidoa in December 1995. On January 17, 1996 six people were killed and ten wounded in two battles. Reuters reported seventy killed in factional fighting in January 1996.

'Ali Mahdi, one of the faction leaders and the interim Somali government president called for UN sponsored reconciliation talks on January 24th. Then on February 12th Mahdi had Abgal clan leader 'Abd al-Rahman Gabow Muhammad's house shelled and him arrested because Muhammad had withdrawn his clans support from 'Ali Mahdi and formed a new independent group opposing him. One person was killed in that attack. His call for UN sponsored reconciliation talks appear less sincere in light of his actions.<sup>164</sup>

Boutros-Boutros Ghali, the UN Secretary-General reported that Somali political faction leaders supported voluntary disarmament in Resolution 923 signed in Nairobi on 24 March 1994, but by the Secretary Generals 18 July 1994 report they had already reneged on that commitment by rearming and replenishing their weapons supplies.<sup>165</sup> Reports from UN observers in 1995 also indicated that clans were rebuilding their defensive positions. During the first week of February 1996 a group broke from 'Ali Mahdi's faction and Joined with Aydid's faction. Aydid had himself declared president and

appointed the defectors from 'Ali Mahdi to ministerial and vice-presidential positions within his "government." The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) announced on 13 February 1996 that the Islamic group that supports 'Ali Mahdi then kidnapped 'Abd al-Rahman Gabo Mahmud, the Aydid vice president on February 12th, imprisoned him and stated that it would try him with eleven other traitors to the 'Ali Mahdi "government" in its courts.

Many Somali citizens feel they have been betrayed by all the warlord-managed political factions. The factional militias have destroyed the Somali country and way of life and continue to disrupt security, hinder the reconstruction progress and inspire more outside interference. A bountiful banana harvest in 1995 was difficult to ship because Aydid had closed the main port in Muqadishyu with his armed militia. The sale of those bananas would have provided hard currency needed to revive the Somali economy. The bananas also represented many man-hours of Somali work. It's a small wonder the common people feel betrayed by these warlords.

No progress toward a national reconciliation process can be made until the many clan/political factions and their leaders decide to work seriously together to ensure stability. But the impression has been created, that despite the prolonged suffering of the Somali people, these leaders and their factions are still not prepared to subordinate their personal ambitions for power to the cause of peace and stability in Somalia.<sup>166</sup>



## 8.2 The Present Conditions of Life

The conditions in Somalia and Afghanistan involve several aspects of civilized life: the current judicial situation, the nature of each country's infrastructure, the impact of the destruction of urban centers, the destruction of agricultural/pastoral areas with the hazard of landmines, and current interference from outside sources.

In Somalia the vacuum created by the lack of a functioning government judicial system has led to an expansion of the role of traditional clan-based Islamic courts. These courts settled property disputes and other civil matters during the Barre regime. Now the Islamic courts decide criminal cases as well and apply strict *Shari'ah* law. The courts are not standardized in any way, are under factional control and provide no procedural safeguards for a fair trial. There is no right to appeal the verdicts and the defendants are not provided with legal counsel.<sup>167</sup> A February 1996 BBC broadcast described an example of the tenuous legal situation; the arrest of 'Abd al-Rahman, Aydid's newly nominated vice-president, by an Islamic court under the influence of 'Ali Mahdi. 'Abd al-Rahman had formerly been associated with 'Ali Mahdi, but recently switched to the Aydid self-declared government. The independent judiciary system promised in Nairobi in March 1994 has not been forthcoming.

The collapse of the national judicial system in Afghanistan led the municipal and provincial authorities there to rely on *Shari'ah* law combined with tribal codes of justice. These Islamic laws when interpreted by radical fundamentalist groups have led to extreme rulings such as a ban on videotapes, public music and dancing and four women being

stoned to death. Mullah Rocketi's forces of the *Ittihad-i Islami* party, hung captives upside down and beat them. Two brothers who had murdered a rival were executed in Herat after an on-the-spot adjudication by an Islamic magistrate.<sup>168</sup>

The infrastructure of both Afghanistan and Somalia are devastated from civil war. Somalia from the time of colonialism to the present has never really had an established, effective infrastructure. The governments of Afghanistan and Somalia have been managed by poorly trained administrators who have followed the traditions of preceding rulers by placing kin in all positions of power. The majority of state funds being used in expenditures on bureaucratic and military functions with little remaining for the development of a basic infrastructure for the country, Afghanistan being the more fortunate of the two.<sup>169</sup>

Between 1964 and 1969 never was less than 65 percent of Somalia's total annual government expenditures were allocated to defense spending. After agriculture spending was deducted there was very little of the budget left for developing transportation, medical facilities, schools, electricity, water, and other necessary elements of an independent nation's solid infrastructure.<sup>170</sup> In Afghanistan where the infrastructure had been developing smoothly but civil war has destroyed much of it, United Nations Volunteers (UNV) specialists are using the rebuilding of shared infrastructure such as wells, hospitals and mosques as a means of bringing warring factions together in a strategy of rural rehabilitation supported by United Nations Development Program (UNDP).<sup>171</sup>

Communications facilities exist in both Afghanistan and Somalia but as might be expected newspaper, and radio and television broadcasts reflect factional viewpoints. Kabul communications sources are pro-Rabbani, but two major rivals, Hekmatyar and Dostam have their own television and radio stations broadcasting from near Kabul and Mazar al-Sharif. In Somalia the main sources of information are the radio stations in Muqadishyu and the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) but broadcasts are also received from Cairo and Rome. Newspapers are printed in Somalia but with a literacy rate of barely 30% most information must be broadcast. A popular form of expression and sometimes of dissidence in Somalia is poetry. Recitations by Somali poets, especially dissidents, are often tape recorded, distributed, and enjoyed as popular entertainment.<sup>172</sup>

The warring factions are selling historical and cultural treasures of the Afghan National Museum in Kabul in international markets. The United Nations and Afghan refugees are appealing to collectors not to buy them. The war has also destroyed or damaged centuries-old archaeological, historical and cultural sites and artifacts throughout Afghanistan.

Many mosques have been destroyed by bombing, looting, earthquake, landslide, and flood. However, in a desperate attempt by the Afghan communists to win back the trust of the people they repaired bombed mosques and gave religious leaders the power to review textbooks and exempted religious land from taxes.<sup>173</sup> Somali political faction's on-again off-again reconciliation talks are being mediated by the Imam of Hirab.

Both Somalia and Afghanistan are the scene of widespread robbery, theft, looting, murder, rape, and politically motivated kidnapping and hostage-taking. The current police forces are more accurately identified as political faction militias and are engaged more in factional feuding than arresting criminals. The European Forum for Urban Safety (Paris) and the International Centre for the Prevention of Crime (Montreal) are working together to formulate projects designed to develop institutional bonds of social control aimed at crime prevention and control. The two organizations are recruiting a social worker and a judge as their two crime prevention specialists for assignment to Somalia.<sup>174</sup>

The U.S. State Department warns in its travel advisories that no health facilities or medicines are available in Somalia and are very limited in Afghanistan with hospitals and doctors expecting immediate cash payments for health services. The European Commission Humanitarian Office (ECHO) allocated six million European Community Units to Somalia for medical development in 1994.<sup>175</sup>

Transportation routes in Afghanistan are in complete disrepair, but the Pakistani news agencies are reporting that the Pakistan government will pay for the repair of the Herat-Qandahar highway that connects Pakistan with Turkmenistan through Afghanistan. The work will be done by Afghan engineers under the supervision of Afghanistan authorities. On March 14, 1996, Reuters reported that the Afghan Foreign Affairs Minister, Najib Allah Lafr'i protested Pakistan's offer. Domestic air service is almost non-existent in both Afghanistan and Somalia. The fact that surface to air missiles have been

made available to many factions in Afghanistan has resulted in an directive that no U.S. airline may land in or overfly Afghan airspace.

The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) with a budget of US\$ 20 million has been working on road construction in Somalia since 1 May 1994. Africare is also working on road stabilization in the northeast. The airfields and ports in Somalia are in good working order so humanitarian assistance can be received easily, however, the main port in Muqadishyu has been closed by General Aydid to raise the cost of goods, particularly food and fuel. He has kept the port at Merca open to export his bananas because they are the source of hard currency earnings to support him and his quest for power.<sup>176</sup>

The same Somali Rehabilitation Program under the UNDP is working on bore holes and establishing water committees to improve the availability of potable water and sanitation. Additionally, in 1993, the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) spent \$50 million on projects including water and sanitation as well as aid from AICF, MSF/Spain. The current travel advisory lists water and electricity as unobtainable.<sup>177</sup>

In Afghanistan water pollution increases as inadequate water and sanitation infrastructure fails to meet the needs of growing urban populations resulting from immigration from the countryside. The CARE sponsored Kabul Water and Sanitation Project manages the urban drinking water supply for two-thirds of the city of Kabul. CARE is also the lead agency in solid and liquid waste removal.<sup>178</sup> ECHO is assisting with a major water supply program in the refugee camps at Jalalabad and Mazar al-Sharif.<sup>179</sup>

In the area of education NGOs such as Save the Children and CARE were working in Afghanistan to train teachers and rebuild schools. Each school received a supply of teaching materials, textbooks, and other supplies. Aid organizations have also established an education *shura* or parents organization to keep up with school maintenance, attendance of teachers and students and other issues surrounding their community school.<sup>180</sup> In Somalia the "Street Children Redemption Educational and Recreation Pilot Project" supported by UNICEF and UNESCO and WFP is being implemented. The first participants will be about one hundred children between the ages of six and twelve years. These children will receive food and approximately four hours of education daily.<sup>181</sup>

The destruction of the urban centers in Somalia and Afghanistan is considerable. The bombing of Kabul is an almost daily occurrence and Muqadishyu is the central location of factional fighting in Somalia. Terrance Lyons, a research associate with the Brookings Institute and specialist in Somalia in an interview with CNN stated that the people of Somalia are living without schools, hospitals and electricity.<sup>182</sup> From the situation report of December 30, 1994 it appears that all the abandoned international facilities have been looted and destroyed. The Secretary-General reported in May 1994 that estimations for the reconstruction of sanitation and prison facilities were being compiled. He warned however, that the destruction of the physical facilities was so thorough that financially it may only be possible to rehabilitate one or two facilities throughout the entire country per year. The UNDP and the UN Center for Human

Settlements were cooperating in the formulation of a program to support shelter reconstruction and the rehabilitation of the physical facilities.<sup>183</sup>

The heavy rain and flooding of November 5, 1995 caused buildings to collapse in several areas of Muqadishyu. The cities of Muqadishyu and Hargeysa have been reduced to rubble, with government buildings and homes looted or razed by armed gangs. Even the telephone wires have been dug up, stolen and exported for sale to the United Arab Emirates.<sup>184</sup>

The Afghanistan News Service reports that Pakistan's embassy in Kabul was burned in 1995. In a human rights report the Service states that most of Kabul's workers are unemployed due to the destruction of the city's manufacturing base. A landslide on 27 March 1995, and an earthquake on 31 January 1996, caused further destruction to houses, public buildings and mosques.<sup>185</sup>

The effects of the civil war on rural areas are strongly felt since the majority of the populations of Somalia and Afghanistan inhabit small remote villages and are agriculturists. The destruction of irrigation systems, the disrepair of rural roads, the depleted herds, and the landmines scattered across the rural lands they farm and graze will take time to recover. If an embassy in Kabul is burned or a school in Muqadishyu is destroyed it has little effect on the majority of the population. When ten million landmines from many nations are spread across grazing and farming land in rural Afghanistan---that is devastation. When whole tribes of herdsman in Somalia sell their herds it will take years for that tribe to recover.

In Afghanistan irrigation systems were destroyed and the farm land bombed. According to an SCA survey in 1985, more than half of the farmers in Afghanistan reported the bombing of their villages, more than a quarter of them reported the destruction of irrigation systems and more than a quarter of them reported the shooting of livestock.<sup>186</sup> Twelve separate relief agencies including European, American, and Arab NGOs and the ICRC operating largely with funds from USAID and UNHCR were rehabilitating farmland, clearing mines, reconstructing irrigation systems and providing improved seeds, insecticides and water pumps. Every district of the provinces of Afghanistan had at least one active project.<sup>187</sup>

CARE is sponsoring the Afghan Village Assistance Program which provided food to about 350,000 returning refugees for their work on rebuilding homes and roads, repairing irrigation systems, controlling erosion, planting trees and home vegetable gardens. This project was implemented in the Paktika, Paktia, Logar, Wardak, Kabul, Parwan, and Maidan provinces.<sup>188</sup>

USAID withdrew its developmental and reconstruction aid and encouraged other relief organizations to withhold all but emergency subsistence aid from Afghanistan when its government persisted in condoning cultivation, processing, smuggling and trafficking of illegal drugs. Since the departure of the relief organizations, caretaker teams of non-combatant men living with groups of women and children in the battered ruins of mountain villages repair the canals to irrigate the fields. These groups tend the few flocks that have escaped the civil war. The Afghan villagers also attempt to keep the agricultural



land viable by controlling erosion without the assistance they had received through international aid.<sup>189</sup> Trees cut to replace scarce heating fuel contributes to the problem of deforestation. Afghans are also cutting and smuggling wood to Pakistan for hard currency. The international aid organizations have withdrawn much of their support for the rehabilitation programs they had sponsored desertification and erosion of agricultural and pastoral land is unchecked.

Perhaps the most insidious impact of East-West involvement in Afghanistan are the existence of landmines. While occupying Afghanistan the Soviets air-dropped millions of anti-personnel landmines from helicopters widely scattering them along guerrilla routes, mountain passes, areas around roads, garrison and military facility perimeters. Mines were also used by the Soviets to destroy the rural economy and displace the population. Hundreds of thousands of mines were strewn across fields and pastures for no other reason than to kill the livestock and make the fields untillable. The *mujahidin* also employed landmines liberally in their efforts to hinder the movements of government and Soviet forces. These mines were supplied by various patrons.

Landmines are still being cleared in Afghanistan by CARE which will also soon begin working in the country with its pilot program under their global landmine initiative to be launched in 1996.<sup>190</sup> The landmines responsible for the most deaths of farmers and herders are the anti-personnel mines, designed to maim rather than kill. These mines strike indiscriminately making them a threat to non-combatants and livestock.<sup>191</sup>

The most commonly used anti-personnel mine was the Soviet PFM-1 "butterfly

mine." It is named for its size and shape and ability to flutter to the ground from airborne dispensers by means of a "wing" that makes it resemble a butterfly or sycamore seed as it spins through the air. The butterfly mine is just powerful enough to blow off a foot or hand, achieving its intentional goal of maiming rather than killing. Wounded, the *mujahidin* warrior would then become a burden to the group and be rendered inactive in partisan activities.<sup>192</sup> The butterfly mine is made of green plastic when dispersed in pasture land and brown plastic for desert terrain and have been mistaken for toys by children. Children become the unintended victims of mines since they are curious and commonly theirs is the job of following the herds dispersed across the countryside.<sup>193</sup>

Afghanistan's Mine Clearance Program is the longest-running UN supported program of its kind. Almost 110,000 mines have been cleared in the past six years out of the 10 million mines that have been laid in Afghanistan since 1979. A lack of security within Afghanistan has forced the mine clearance operation to remain based in Pakistan, but two of three regional offices are located in-country in Kabul and Quetta with the third in Peshawar in Pakistan.

Three thousand Afghan deminers are engaged in 48 teams along with ten canine mine detection teams. In the rocky terrain of Afghanistan most mines are surface laid, but for sub-surface mines the oldest method of mine detecting and clearance called "prodding" is also the only efficient method because many of the mines are non-detectable plastic mines. The use of butterfly mines is banned by the Geneva Convention, which specifically forbids combatants to use mines that cannot be detected by normal means and that have

an unlimited life span.<sup>194</sup> Dog teams are being trained because their acute sense of smell can detect the vapors from the explosive agent just above the ground. Very few dogs or their handlers have ever been killed or injured.

The demining program in Afghanistan costs about \$25 million per year. In 1993, the United Nations identified 45.5 square miles were designated as high priority areas like roads, abandoned villages, farmland, pasture, and land around wells where landmines interfere with the Afghans return to normalcy. Most individuals fall victim to landmines placed by government forces and *mujahidin* in rural and remote locations and may die of their injuries before they can reach distant medical care. UNICEF has instituted a mine awareness program in Afghanistan. The program focuses on children's recognition of mines and what to do in the event of an accident.<sup>195</sup>

The inaccessibility of agricultural and pastoral land due to mines in Somalia has been reduced by the intensive efforts of the many relief organizations represented there. The demining activity in Somalia was begun by UNOSOM II and is based on the employment of native deminers only. Native deminer groups know the location of many minefields and enjoy the support of the local council who will provide further information about mines in the area. There are thirteen groups employed now in Somalia while an additional five will be trained soon.

The impact of landmines in Somalia can be gauged by the numbers of destroyed mines. 3210 anti-tank mines and 1116 anti-personnel mines were removed from March to May 1994 by five teams. These operations have resulted in 71 square kilometers of

grazing land cleared and 318.5 kilometers of roads cleared of landmines from 1 January to 24 May 1994. UNHCR and UNESCO have implemented a mine awareness program using posters, books and community group discussions. The demining program is preparing for an acceleration by restructuring and an increase in staffing.<sup>196</sup>

Efforts are also under way to increase agricultural production. USAID projections for 1996 work include increasing food crop production by increasing the amount of land under cultivation, rehabilitating the water resources, and by improving seed multiplication practices and by establishing community-based agriculture extension services. The land under cultivation during the 1993 *Gu* (main growing) season was forty percent of the prewar level in the fertile areas. This was increased to eighty percent in the 1994 *Gu* season by the resettlement programs that provided seed and tools and to the food-for-work program that kept the farmers on the land during the growing season.<sup>197</sup>

Seeds, tools, pesticides and sprayers were also being distributed by UNV to some 30,000 displaced and returning farmers and agro-pastoralists in north Somalia.<sup>198</sup> Small scale seed-multiplication projects are designed to assist local farmers to multiply quality certified seeds and then to sell the seed within their own communities. By recovering their costs in this manner they will be able to continue the seed multiplication business when the donated funds have run out.<sup>199</sup>

Not all Somali assistance projects are providing the expected or hoped for results. The Mogambo Irrigation Project was abandoned by Australian managers in 1989 after government military forces fought Ogaden rebels on the project site. The project stands

idle even after investments of US\$40 million by German and Kuwaiti development banks. The Jubba Sugar Project, a US\$200 million investment continued to function through 1989, but has been raided for vehicles, cash, and other supplies by warring factions and now operates at only a fraction of its capacity.<sup>200</sup>

Outside influences are still at work in Afghanistan and Somalia. Money flows into these countries in the form of development and humanitarian assistance altering its foundation and the state of its economy. U.S. government assistance in the period 1991-1995 for Somalia, not including the costs of U.S. military aid was \$343,492,200. USAID requested another \$5,563,086 for 1996. When the donations from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, the European Economic Community and the NGOs are added the aid totals billions over a five year period. The impact of this amount of money flooding into a country whose people who have lived and adjusted to the circumstances of their environment for thousands of years is incalculable.

The Somalis have grazed their herds of cattle, sheep, goats and camels wherever there was food and water and when it ran out, they moved on. For farmers too famines were common in those days. They were caused not just by drought but also by insects that could destroy an entire years' harvest. The people survived in the past and the Somalis would have in 1991-1992. The Somalis of the blighted regions would have migrated to Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti to their tribal cousins to wait out the drought. When the rains returned as they did it 1993, the Somalis would have returned to their own clan-based areas in Somalia.

Instead of this time proven tradition, when they reached the borders during the drought of 1990/1991 they were "rescued" into refugee camps where they died of malaria, measles, dysentery, diphtheria, cholera, and pneumonia, not starvation.<sup>201</sup> Diseases such as these that had not been a problem when the family groups had been dispersed became epidemic when tens of thousands of people were crowded into refugee camps.

### 6.3 Current Foreign Interference

The first world community still interferes in Somalia trying to develop and assist it by attempting to form it to a Western idea of what a stable country should look like. The billions of dollars the international community pour into Somalia only encourage the warring factions to fight, to gain power, to gain access to the aid. As the UN began to gain the trust of the warring parties and acceptance among the people, a Russian plane with UN markings and chartered by a UN agency delivered currency and military equipment to north Muqadishyu, the area of 'Ali Mahdi. This infuriated Aydid and rekindled the old idea that the UN favored 'Ali Mahdi over other factions. In October, another Russian plane containing suspicious cargo crashed in northern Muqadishyu on an illegal flight.<sup>202</sup> Not to be deterred, Italy continues working with the World Bank toward economic recovery in Somalia.<sup>203</sup>

Recent reports of the United Nations Secretary General as well as BBC reports suggest Libyan ruler Mu'ammarr Qaddafi is investing millions of Libyan oil dollars to incite fighting by bankrolling Aydid in Muqadishyu and the militants who oppose the

government in Somaliland. His plan apparently is to bring Aydid to power in Somalia and jeopardize the peace and stability of the new country and government of the Somaliland Republic. This would seem to be corroborated by the presence of the Libyan ambassador, Mustafa Salim al-Amush at an Aydid ceremony on 9 February honoring the installation of six defectors from the 'Ali Mahdi camp in their new senior posts in the self-proclaimed Aydid government.<sup>204</sup>

In Afghanistan, the relief organizations have limited their aid strictly to emergency assistance and the clearance of landmines due to the drug trafficking problem and instability of the government. Pakistan is said to be funding and training the Taliban movement. Iran supports the *Wahadat* party in Afghanistan. Saudi groups support other Afghan factions in their rivalry with Iran.<sup>205</sup> As the Americans withdrew their support after the Soviets left the Saudis increased theirs. Since November 1989 various groups of *mujahidin* have received over US\$435 million from Saudi Arabia.<sup>206</sup>

Political observers say that the UN attempt in 1995 to convince the Afghans to set up a broad-based council failed because of outside support of opposing Afghan factions.<sup>207</sup>

## 9. CONCLUSION: WHY POORLY CONSIDERED FOREIGN INTERVENTION DOES NOT BENEFIT AFGHANISTAN OR SOMALIA

The problems that must be considered are:

1. The Legacy of the Cold War in Somalia and Afghanistan
2. The Ineffectiveness of Outside Military Intervention in a Civil War
3. Why Humanitarian Aid Harms More Than It Helps

### 9.1 The Legacy of the Cold War in Somalia and Afghanistan

The Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States touched many countries in the years between 1946 and 1989. The Soviets searched for an opening to establish a socialist government by means of enticement with gifts of modern weaponry, rubles and promised a better standard of living for everyone. In third world countries they found many leaders willing to accept their offers of assistance.

The leaders of Afghanistan and Somalia attempted to play one superpower against the other in efforts to get as much from each as they could. In Afghanistan the Americans and Soviets "slugged it out toe-to-toe" with dollars and rubles. As an example of how the Cold War was fought on political, economic fronts in Afghanistan consider the following. When the Russians built a modern road in the north, the Americans built one in the south. When the Americans built dams, the Soviets built a tunnel. The Afghans appreciated the results and continued the game.<sup>208</sup> Somalia was important because of its strategic proximity to the oil-rich Arabian peninsula. The battle there was also economic, but the



dollars and rubles came in the form of advanced military weaponry and port improvements, first from the Soviets and then from the United States. The Soviets wanted both Somalia and Afghanistan as clients to purchase Soviet weapons and manufactured goods as well as converts to the Marxist/Leninist idea of government.

United States actions in Somalia and Afghanistan during the Cold War had very little effect on the US. Billions of tax dollars were spent and some wasted. When the U.S. military discovered during Desert Shield that the Somali base at Berbera was not necessary for a deployment to the Middle East, military justification for further involvement in Somalia was negated. This fact was reinforced since the Soviet Union had ceased to exist.

The U.S. and Soviets left behind in Afghanistan and Somalia weaponry the likes of which a third world country had never imagined. These two countries which were just entering the 20th century stage of development were suddenly supplied with state-of-the-art military weapons. People adhering to a long tradition of kinship ties and feuding between clans who used to raid rival camps and steal camels and make payoffs of money and property to satisfy offenses, now had it within their power to fire a missile into a rival clan's camp. The whole concept of tribal feuding now took on much more lethal overtones. Landmines alone kill some ten thousand non-combatants every year and thousands more are maimed or blinded or otherwise injured. To provide an idea of the time involved in the removal of the estimated 10 million landmines deployed in

Afghanistan today, one needs only to look at the past. In six years only 110,000 of the 10 million mines have been removed.<sup>209</sup>

Did the East-West powers consider the implications of uncontrolled landmine warfare before landmines were introduced to Somalia and Afghanistan? Perhaps the consequences were not considered important enough to interfere with the goal of winning the war.

The CIA and the US government had great misgivings about providing Stinger anti-aircraft missiles to the *mujahidin*. They were worried that the advanced missiles might fall into the hands of the Iranians and then might be used by a terrorist group against civilian airliners. The U.S. government was also worried that the Soviets might obtain the advanced technology. But by mid-1986, the United States government had agreed to an annual allocation of 250 grip-stocks and 1000-1200 missiles to be provided to Afghanistan's *mujahidin*.

U.S. fears were justified. By 1987 both the Soviets and the Iranians had obtained Stingers.<sup>210</sup> The Stinger missile is a shoulder-held, laser-guided weapon that can destroy an aircraft in flight. One man with minimal training can take hundreds of lives in an instant. In 1989 the United State and Saudi Arabia supplied US\$ 1.3 billion in weapons that included Stingers, heavy artillery, and other arms appropriate for a shift from guerrilla to conventional warfare. As Afghans continue to fight, the millions of weapons the Cold Warriors left behind will begin to seep through its porous boundaries de-stabilizing neighboring countries.<sup>211</sup>

The Soviets provided SAM-2 anti-aircraft missiles to Somalia, somewhat less sophisticated but still very deadly to civilian aircraft. Various Somali factions have also inherited the Soviet missiles that were stored in a facility near Berbera along with a plentiful supply of small arms.

These weapons combined with millions of landmines, provided by foreign interlopers, leave Afghanistan and Somalia an impressive inheritance of death. The present situation in these two countries is quite ironic considering the foreign motives behind the original weapons shipments were to keep friendly governments in power. In both Afghanistan and Somalia crops are not planted in much of the countryside because the fields are planted instead with a crop of mines. Hundreds of thousands of non-combatants have died in Afghanistan and Somalia from inter-clan violence since 1979 in Afghanistan and 1986 in Somalia. Most of the death has been the result of intervention from foreign arms suppliers sent on their delivery errands by misguided political decisions.

## 9.2 The Ineffectiveness of Foreign Military Intervention in Civil War

In an effort to understand and examine the ineffectiveness of the political policy of foreign military intervention as a tool to solve intranational strife, I will discuss Soviet intervention in the Afghanistan civil war and United States intervention in the Somalia civil war. I will also discuss the effects this intervention has on the people of Afghanistan and Somalia. The obvious contrast of the Soviet forces fighting for ten years and the US and West forces fighting for only fourteen months does not discount the results of each.

Neither the Soviet Union or the United States were remotely successful in reaching their objective of ending internal hostilities, installing a stable government favorable to the benefactor, and instating peace.

Twenty months before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan of 27 December 1979, President Daud, a Pashtun had been in power for five years. A Soviet sponsored political party called the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) led by Nur Taraki overthrew Daud in April of 1978. Radical decrees issued by the new government in Kabul caused much unrest in Afghanistan. These unpopular decrees dealt with changes in marriage customs and land reform.

The Taraki/PDPA decrees outraged Afghan women because it set a maximum bride-price leaving women without economic security. Afghan moneylenders were unhappy because another PDPA decree totally forgave selected debtors their loans. Afghan peasants were angry because by that same decree the traditional sources of their annual loans had dried up. Religious leaders were furious because the green stripe of Islam on the national flag had been replaced by red representing Afghanistan's new ties with the Soviet Union. The traditional Muslim invocation had also been omitted from the new decrees and Taraki had announced that he was going to reform Islam from its outdated traditions, superstitions and erroneous beliefs.<sup>212</sup> Even the Soviets advised against these radical changes.

In May 1978, one month after the coup that brought the PDPA to power, Burhan al-Din Rabbani formed the first anti-PDPA organization the National Rescue Front(NRF).

NRF forces occasionally placed bombs Kabul and published a flood of anti-government propaganda notices. In September 1978, an anti-PDPA insurrection flared in Nuristan followed by uprisings in Badakhshan, Paktia, Ghazni, Balkh, Herat, Farah, Parvan, and Kapsia provinces. The PDPA responded by attacking those villages resulting in extensive loss of life and more animosity against the Soviet backed PDPA government.<sup>213</sup> Afghanistan's civil war had begun in earnest.

The settling of scores between tribes and kin had been escalated by the brutal tactics of the government and guerrilla forces began to emerge for revenge. The invasion of the Soviet Army in December 1979, provided an impetus to the forming of tentative bonds between guerrilla groups and united them against a common enemy, the Soviet invader. When the Soviets were forced to pull out in 1989 they left behind experienced guerrillas, *mujahidin*, fighting a Soviet installed and endorsed government in Kabul.

Despite the fact that the invader has retreated there is little visible change in the political and military situation in Afghanistan. On the 25th of February 1996 Afghan government jets bombed rebel positions outside Kabul and the rebels retaliated with rocket fire on the city.<sup>214</sup> Very much the same picture as that painted in the months prior to Soviet invasion and war, but as stated before, now the warring factions have heightened military killing capabilities.

Before President Bush sent American troops into Somalia in 1992, Somali faction leaders were fighting for control of the massive quantity of foreign aid pouring into the country as a means of legitimizing their party's claim to governmental authority. Also

highly visible on the television screens of America were the starving, gaunt children. Reports of donated food being withheld or sold to the hungry by detestable warlords prompted a media call for action. American political leaders did not consider the political situation in which no Somali leader could be identified who would be recognized by his fellows as legitimate. It was not recognized that each Somali clan leader was more interested in his own position of power than the condition of their fellow countrymen. What mattered were the faces of starving children on American television and polls showing that the voters demanded action. The obvious solution was to provide military security for the aid shipments.

U.S. Marines landing on the beaches of Muqadishyu was an international photo opportunity with news teams and photographers meeting the soldiers instead of enemy fire.<sup>215</sup> That would change. The State Department provided the security forces with no information of friendly parties, no indication of what constituted reasonable force, or what measures could be taken to protect themselves and the aid.

The confusion was not limited to the ground forces in Somalia. In 1993 United Nations Secretary General Boutros-Boutros Ghali decided that Aydid was an enemy he should focus on, so he put a \$25,000 price on his head. Unfortunately because Aydid was a leader of a main political faction, his involvement was also necessary for a political process to reconcile the warring factions and rebuild a Somali state. The United Nations was negotiating for peace between Aydid and 'Ali Mahdi while Clinton was ordering Delta Force hunt down and capture Aydid. The U.S. Secretary of State decided against

allowing armored vehicles or air support for the U.S. ground forces to ensure that the warring factions would not take this heavy support as a step by the UN to support one leader over another.<sup>216</sup>

Delta Force came under what seemed an unlimited supply of Somali firepower on October 3rd and they were only armed with M16s and M60s with a minimal load of ammunition. Eighteen U.S. soldiers died, "(m)any more of Delta Force were wounded in body and spirit, questioning the leaders of their own country who would so readily sacrifice them."<sup>217</sup> Sentiments expressed by Soviet and Afghan troops during Soviet involvement in Afghanistan.

When all American troops were pulled out on March 31, 1994, it was clear the Somali factions had won the right to continue their war without outside interference. Many Somalis had been fed, but the country was no closer to establishing peace or an effective government.<sup>218</sup> The sacrifice of the eighteen U.S. lives was in vain. The political factions continue fighting to this day as the 12 February 1996 shelling of Gabow Muhammad's house by the 'Ali Mahdi faction clearly illustrates.

Neither the military intervention of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan's civil war or the military intervention of the United States in Somalia's civil war made any significant change for the better. The factions were fighting and killing each other before and they continue to do so now. The Soviet Union and the United States suffered the loss of lives for no apparent gain. There is new leadership in power in Moscow following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The new government has refused to take any

responsibility for the ten-year war in Afghanistan, but rather directed the blame on the former government and Red Army troops. Soviet military writers label the intervention "a bad decision" by the previous leaders of the country.<sup>219</sup> Likewise, United States political figures ignore the irony of hunting Aydid then a week later, ferrying him to meetings in a U.S. helicopter with U.S. military bodyguards.

The futility of becoming militarily involved and attempting to install peace by disarming a populace is not hidden from the American public, of course hind sight is 20/20. Larry Joyce, a retired Army officer who spent two tours in Vietnam and father of one of the dead soldiers in the failed 3 October 1993 Muqadishyu operation, states that President Clinton and his immature White House staff would like the nation "to forget those eighteen brave young men who died last October (1993) trying so courageously to accomplish the frivolous mission he gave them."<sup>220</sup> Ross Perot said in the foreword of *Muqadishyu! Heroism and Tragedy*, "Our military troops love this country and are willing to fight and die for it. We have an enormous obligation not to take advantage of their idealism and patriotism. The relevant question to ask before sending these men and women into combat is, would you and I be willing to die for this cause?"<sup>221</sup> Obviously that question was not considered as was ignored the lack of an identifiable, potential political hierarchy.

The military interventions by the Soviets in Afghanistan and the United States in Somalia did not stop interclan fighting in either country. Both United States and the Soviet Union left behind stockpiles of state-of-the-art weapons of mass destruction.



Soviet and American soldiers, Afghan and Somali noncombatants died without an understanding on the part of the East-West political machines, of the real situation of the country and poorly planned power projection. Afghan and Somali noncombatants were killed. The Afghan and Somali states are still plagued by tribal violence.

### 9.3 How Humanitarian Aid Can Harm as Much as it Helps

Unlike military aid, humanitarian aid appears wholesome, helpful, and engenders the givers with a feeling that they are helping poor, backward countries approach a better lifestyle. This can be true if all aspects and impacts of humanitarian aid were well considered and planned with a goal in mind.

The national welfare system in the United States, the former Soviet Union, and many European countries has not produced the intended results because a goal for the individuals on collecting welfare were never figured into the goal. Instead of lending a helping hand to people in-between jobs or when they're down on their luck welfare, or public assistance as President Johnson liked to call it, has become a means of living---welfare is the new job. In 1962 President Kennedy stated,

Public welfare, in short, must be more than a salvage operation, picking up the debris from the wreckage of human lives. Its emphasis must be directed increasingly toward prevention and rehabilitation--on reducing not only the long-range cost in budgetary terms but the long-range cost in human terms as well.<sup>222</sup>

Were our public assistance programs a success? Between 1960 to 1977 the number of people receiving public assistance more than doubled and the dollar "amount spent on

food stamps rose more than ten fold."<sup>223</sup> Children raised in homes that exist on welfare grow up believing in their right to collect federal "free" money. No work ethic is instilled in their character. The cycle of dependency is passed from generation to generation. The welfare system does not work on the national level and it does not work on the international level.

"Many Afghans have come to regard outside aid as a right...some groups regularly demand payment for housing, *mujahidin* steal supplies and allow security to grow lax for volunteer medical personnel."<sup>224</sup> In Somalia, the refugees were totally dependent on international relief, slightly less so in Afghanistan, and it became an important economic resource and an important source of income in both countries national economy.<sup>225</sup> Additionally, the international humanitarian aid that came in the form of cash contributions from the West and totalling \$ 4.2 billion by 1989, ended up mainly in the pockets of the ruling faction or party even when there was a severe shortage of food.<sup>226</sup>

The money given to government and non-government relief organizations first priority is to pay for the administration costs of delivering the free food given to them by the United States government. Of the remaining funds that actually arrives at the target government for projects such as infrastructure improvements, almost none ever actually benefits those in need. This internationalization of public welfare, especially the donor/NGO system grew at a phenomenal rate in the 1980's and expanded still further in the first half of the 1990's.<sup>227</sup> There is a definite correlation between this rise in foreign aid and the decline in economic performance in the countries that receive it.<sup>228</sup>

The once productive lives of Afghan and Somali nomads herding their animals, and farmers planting soybeans and maize have been transformed into welfare system parasites. Men working in Beledweyne, Somalia for 800 shillings a month (an extraordinarily high salary) could not purchase the amount of food those living in refugee camps received free. The ambiguity of this situation creates an additional internal strife between the working population and the refugees. Many quit their jobs and go to live in the refugee camps or they send a few of their family members to live there.<sup>229</sup> The free food aid doled out at the refugee camps cause depressed local market prices and force farmers to cease growing food crops and instead grow cash crops to export such as *ghat* in Somalia and opium poppies in Afghanistan.<sup>230</sup>

The result of farmers growing cash crops rather than food crops is famine and that plays into the hands of the warring political leaders. When the people are producing their own food they control their own lives, but when they must rely on aid supplied food, control passes to whoever controls the distribution of that food. Faction leaders control when and if the refugees in the camps eat.<sup>231</sup> Food and food aid become economic and political tools for the faction warlords to fight over.<sup>232</sup>

The more the relief services are expanded the more refugees arrive. An attempt must be made to reform the donor/NGO safety net with limitations to keep countries from welfare dependency during the 1990's.<sup>233</sup> Despite two successive investigative missions reporting that the district councils UNOSOM had organized were completely

obsolete, the United Nations Development Office of Somalia (UNDOS) the new UNOSOM recommended funding the councils in one region with half a million dollars.<sup>234</sup>

Uncontrolled humanitarian aid encourages the continued internal violent power struggle by supplying economic funding, food, and medical supplies to warlords who disperse or withhold the aid in return for allegiance, and act as a deterrent to the organization of a government in which the warlord may play only a minor role. Uncontrolled humanitarian aid discourages individuals from working and developing a stable government and economy. Humanitarian aid destroys the historical and cultural lifestyle of the nomad pastoralist and agro-pastoralist.

Humanitarian aid creates communities of international welfare parasites. The humanitarian aid organizations, both NGOs and United Nations sponsored have failed in Somalia and Afghanistan to create a self-sustaining population. Hundreds of billions aid dollars over the past years have left both more famine prone and dependent on outside relief. They have not helped the refugees leave the camps, get their livestock back, or grow food to become independent. The goal of relief for farmers should be to decrease the food given over time and teach new farming practices and provide the equipment to assist them in overcoming drought. For herders, help replace lost camels and other livestock and let them return to the life they know in the desert. Afghans and Somalis need to be given back the responsibility for their own lives and a chance to reclaim their dignity.<sup>235</sup>

The United States is in the position of setting the world's standards of lifestyle and quality without respect for differing cultures and priorities, possible economic problems and what the system will bear.<sup>236</sup> The developed world sets the standards and aid is used to force less developed countries into that mold. Within most developed countries and especially in the United States, a great value is placed on cultural diversity and acceptance of another cultures norms. However, in dealing with the Third World the UN aid organizations arrive with a preconceived model for an economy, government, infrastructure, and social interaction carbon-copied from the Western developed nations. The UN envoy to Afghanistan encouraged the nation to "be Afghans first" and deny their tribal heritage.<sup>237</sup> A shallow proposal considering the culture of tribalism each individual is born into.

Local conflicts (civil wars) are viewed without regard for the composite nature of the causes. Disputes over resources and fighting for political power are viewed as separate from armed hostilities rather than causes for them that continue even after peace accords are signed.<sup>238</sup>

The United Nations Security Council has called on all countries to respect Afghanistan's right to settle their own internal fighting and to determine their own destiny. However, in the same UN statement the President of the Security Council calls "on all States to take the necessary steps to promote peace in Afghanistan," and supports UN Special Missions broad based consultations in Afghanistan and the Special Missions proposals to end the factional fighting.<sup>239</sup> Russia, the United States, and the developed

countries have agreed to this mandate but Afghanistan's neighbors continue to support various warring factions. Obviously the definition of "foreign intervention and meddling" does not exclude other Third World countries.

In a statement delivered in Paris in 1995, the European Union (EU) announces that it too understands the importance of ending foreign intervention in Afghanistan, but follows with a call for the unimpeded delivery of emergency food and medical assistance and advising that other countries in the region have a key role in rebuilding Afghanistan.<sup>240</sup>

Intervention in Somalia and Afghanistan must be more closely controlled.

"Because groups and movements need to secure or protect sources of food in order to survive physically and politically... those sources in themselves become prime targets for the opposition. Food can be denied by corralling the people into areas or relocating them to unfamiliar areas so they cannot find it on their own and it can also be withheld outright from these refugee camps."<sup>241</sup>

It is extremely difficult for humanitarian aid organizations to provide emergency food and medical care to people in huts in jungles or mountains, or to tents on the desert that change locations daily. To make their job easier they set up stations or camps where the people can receive food and medicine. Because many are traditionally nomads the tribes travel to where the food is and they remain there as long as the food source produces. With the people "corralled" in this way, they are no longer encouraged to leave and forage for or grow other food for themselves.

Humanitarian food is the stable source for the people but it creates a target for local power-seekers. Political warlords have little control over a nomad herding a few camels and goats over the desert eating the yogurt, milk and meat that his animals provide. If however, that same nomad is living in a refugee camp depending on an aid worker to give him his day's supply of unimix dietary supplement and milk, the warlord need only steal the shipment of unimix before it is distributed to control him. This has been illustrated by the closure of Muqadishyu's ports by Aydid and by the blockade around Kabul by the Taliban.

Afghanistan and Somalia are independent countries and the world must recognize their sovereignty and right to control internal power struggles and national destiny. Interference on any level by any outside entity causes problems in the natural course of societal development and the environment. "In the fragile political and environmental ecosystem ...it is much easier to screw things up than it is to set them straight. Foreign powers, East and West through military, political, and economic intervention have had an impact that has been detrimental. The more we meddle, the worse it gets."<sup>242</sup>

## NOTES

1. Duwayne Redmann, *Yellow Hair* manuscript not published, 1989.
2. Thomas Jefferson, The Annals of America, Volume 4, (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1976) 642-644. On page 19, volume 6 of the Britannica Encyclopedia the Holy Alliance is described as "a loose organization of most of the European sovereigns, formed in Paris on Sept. 26, 1815, by Alexander I of Russia, Francis I of Austria, and Fredrick William III of Prussia after the final defeat of Napoleon. The avowed purpose was to promote the influence of Christian principles in the affairs of nations." Grolier Electronic Encyclopedia 1995, points out that eventually Britain, the pope, and the Ottoman sultan signed it also.
3. Ibid., 340-341.
4. Ibid., 644.
5. Encyclopedia Britannica Macropedia, Volume 29 (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, INC., 1987) 248.
6. Ibid., 260.
7. Edgar O'Balance, Tracks of the Bear (Novate, California: Presidio Press, 1982) 3.
8. Ibid., 4.
9. The Annals of America, Volume 16, 367-368.
10. Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Soviet Policy Toward Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan: The Dynamics of Influence (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982) 165.
11. Barbara Kellerman and Jeffrey Z. Rubin eds., Leadership and Negotiation in the Middle East (Praeger: New York, 1988) 211.
12. Ibid.
13. Gerald J. Bender, James S. Coleman, and Richard L. Sklar eds., African Crisis Areas and U.S. Foreign Policy (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985) 186-187.
14. Amin Saikal and William Maley eds., The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) 132.



15. Rosemary Hollis ed., The Soviets, Their Successors and the Middle East: Turning Point (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1993) 8-9.
16. Helen C. Metz, Somalia: A Country Study (Washington D.C.: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1992) xxii. An interesting study of his life and exploits is available by Ray Beachey, *The Warrior Mullah: The Horn Aflame 1892-1920*, London, Bellew Publishing, 1990. "The Mad Mullah was a nickname given him by the British in large part due to his disregard for casualties during his attacks against British forces.
17. Ibid., 123.
18. Richard F. Nyrop and Donald M. Seekins, Afghanistan: A Country Study (Washington D.C.: The American University, 1986) 60. A major reason Afghanistan declined the offer was that the US would not guarantee Afghan borders. The Eisenhower administration and the British hoped to form the "Northern Tier" along with Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan as a check on communism and counter Soviet expansion into the oil regions. Encyclopedia Britannica, vol. 3, 30. *CENTO*, formerly the *Baghdad Pact*, dated from 1955 to 1979 and was composed of Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom. Iraq was a member until 1959. Encyclopedia Britannica, vol. 11, 49. *SEATO* organized, 1955-77. Members included Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United States. Also formed as a barrier to communism. Pakistan's membership in both of these organizations and Afghanistan's absence gave Pakistan the edge it needed when both requested arms following strained relations over border disputes in the 1950's and 60's.
19. Edward R. Girardet, Afghanistan: The Soviet War (London: Croom Helm, 1985) 95. Pakistan closed the overland routes in 1950 and 1955. In 1961 until 1963 they closed the border again, this time including the movements of the nomads in search of pasture. Following this closure Afghanistan became almost totally dependent on the Soviet Union for foreign trade.
20. Paul Overby, Holy Blood: An Inside View of the Afghan War (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Printers, 1993) 31.
21. Nyrop 56.
22. Ali J. Ahmed, The Invention of Somalia (Lawrenceville, New Jersey: The Red Sea Press, 1995) 107.
23. Overby 13.
24. Ioan M. Lewis, Blood and Bone: The Call of Kinship in Somali Society (Lawrenceville, NJ, 1994) 99.

25. Metz 6.
26. Lewis 104.
27. Ibid., 20-22. A dia (from the Arabic *diiya*) consists of four to eight of the most recent generations of a clan. The group is jointly united against outsiders with its major function being the "collective payment of blood-compensation".
28. Ibid., 98.
29. Nyrop 104-105.
30. Ibid., 108.
31. Ibid., 114.
32. Ludwig W. Adamec, Historical Dictionary of Afghanistan (Metuchen, NJ: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1991) 231. There are many other Pashtun tribes in Pakistan and Baluchistan, perhaps as many as fifty. The book *Afghanistan: A Country Study* lists a different set of names for Pashtun tribes in Afghanistan on p. 109, however; Adamec's is more recent.
33. Ibid.
34. Richard F. Nyrop and Donald M. Seekins eds., Afghanistan: A Country Study (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986) 105-112.
35. Ibid., 116.
36. Ahmed 18.
37. Ibid., 16.
38. Abd al-Rahman Ibn Muhammad Ibn Khaldun, Al-Muqaddimah: Translated by Franz Rosenthal (Princeton, 1967) 120.
39. Lewis 105.
40. Metz 124.
41. Lee V. Cassanelli, The Shaping of Somali Society: Reconstructing the History of a Pastoral People, 1600-1900 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982) 256.

42. Samuel M. Makinda, Seeking Peace from Chaos: Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993) 51.
43. Metz 30.
44. Makinda 13.
45. Nyrop 59.
46. Ibid., 60.
47. Girardet 92-93.
48. Lewis 28-29.
49. Ahmed 110-111.
50. Rasul B. Rais, War Without Winners: Afghanistan's Uncertain Transition After the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) 3.
51. Metz 37.
52. Ibid., 39.
53. Makinda 18.
54. Ahmed 115.
55. Lewis 129.
56. Metz 42.
57. Ioan M. Lewis, A Modern History of Somalia: Nation and State in the Horn of Africa (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1988) 236.
58. Makinda 14-15.
59. Metz 42.
60. Mohamed Sahnoun, Somalia: Missed Opportunities (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1994) 9.
61. Nyrop 305. Also Overby, 62, asserts that "keys to arms rooms disappeared; tank batteries were pulled for winterizing... to top it off the night of the invasion the Afghan officers were

invited to a reception and simply locked in the room."

62. Ibid., 307.

63. Brigadier Mohammad Yousaf and Major Mark Adkin, The Bear Trap: Afghanistan's Untold Story (London: Leo Cooper, 1992) 2.

64. Ibid., 137.

65. Girardet 5.

66. Barnett A. Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995) 143.

67. Mark Urban, War in Afghanistan (London: The MacMillan Press, Ltd., 1990) 139.

68. Nyrop 333. Also Girardet, 124-134 discusses the KHAD in great detail. The State Affairs Service (KHAD) was organized with the assistance of the KGB and the head of the KHAD reported directly to the KGB. Dr. Najib Allah was its first director.

69. United States Department of State, Afghanistan Country Report on Human Rights Practices Afghanistan Country Report on Human Rights Practices, 1984.

70. Girardet 128-129.

71. Martin Doornbos, Lionel Cliffe, Abdel G. Ahmed and John Markakis eds., Beyond Conflict in the Horn: Prospects for Peace, Recovery, and Development in Ethiopia, Somalia and the Sudan (London: James Currey Ltd., 1992) 161.

72. Metz 103-104.

73. Ahmed I. Samatar, Socialist Somalia: Rhetoric and Reality (London: Institute for African Alternatives Zed Books Ltd., 1988) 109.

74. Metz 221.

75. Samatar 85.

76. Girardet 109.

77. Ibid., 111.

78. Rubin 115.

79. Ibid., 142.
80. Girardet 107.
81. Sahnoun ix.
82. Metz 209-211.
83. Sahnoun xii.
84. Ibid. 17.
85. United Nations Department of Public Information, "The United Nations and the situation in Somalia", United Nations Reference Paper on Somalia April 1995: 1-10.
86. Ibid. 8.
87. Girardet 101.
88. Nyrop 293-298.
89. Yousaf 217 and 227.
90. Larry B. Lambert, "The Afghan War", The Great Game Homepage March 14, 1996: 1.
91. Yousaf 220.
92. Ibid.
93. Ibid. 77.
94. Lewis, Blood and Bone, 162.
95. Ibid. 160.
96. Thomas Hammond, Red Flag Over Afghanistan (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984).
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98. Urban 99.
99. Lewis, Blood and Bone, 199-200.

100. Ibid. 215-216.
101. Sahnoun 58.
102. United States Agency for International Development (USAID), "USAID FY 1996 Fund Request for Somalia" FY 1996 Development Fund for Africa Request: Somalia \$5,563,086 Sept. 1995: 1-5.
103. Ahmed 114.
104. United States Central Intelligence Agency, 1996 World Factbook: Afghanistan (Washington D.C.: The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency Press, 1996).
105. Larry B. Lambert, "Notable Figures in the Contemporary Great Game" Great Game Homepage , 14 March 1996: 1.
106. Scott R. McMichael, Stumbling Bear: Soviet Military Performance in Afghanistan (London: Brassey's, 1991) 165. Adamec in the *Historical Dictionary of Afghanistan*, 1991, 106-107 also gives comprehensive information about Hekmatyar and the Islamic Party of Afghanistan.
107. Adamec 210-211. Also described under the title of the Islamic Alliance for the Liberation of Afghanistan, 116-117. Also under Ittihad-i Islami Barayi Azadi-yi Afghanistan, 122.
108. Ibid. 237.
109. Ibid. 167.
110. Ibid. 165-169.
111. United States Department of State, "Islamic State of Afghanistan, Government Structure as of 9 October 1995" U.S. Department of State Country Files: Afghanistan 9 October 1995.
112. Larry B. Lambert, "Activities of the Taliban in 1995", Taliban Homepage 14 March 1996: 1.
113. Peter Schraeder, "The Horn of Africa: US Foreign Policy in an Altered Cold War Environment," Middle East Journal no. 4: 46.
114. Patrick J. Sloyhan, "Somalia Mission Control; Clinton called the shots in failed policy targeting Aided," Newsday 5-9 December 1993.
115. Michael Maren, "How the Culture of Aid Gave Us the Tragedy of Somalia," The Village Voice 19 January 1993, 4 of the Nomad Net.

116. USAID FY 1996 Fund Request, 2.
117. Maren, 5.
118. United Nations Department of Public Information, "The United Nations and the Situation in Somalia" Reference Paper April 1995: 1.
119. Ibid. 2.
120. Lewis, Blood and Bone 164-174.
121. Bruce D. Porter, The U.S.S.R. in Third World Conflicts: Soviet Arms and Diplomacy in Local Wars 1945-1980 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984) 183.
122. Nyrop 250.
123. Girardet 237.
124. Rais 11.
125. Ibid. 248-249.
126. Joseph J. Collins, The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: A Study in the Use of Force in Soviet Foreign Policy (Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books, D.C. Heath and Company, 1986) 91.
127. Girardet 177.
128. Ibid. 112.
129. Rais 98.
130. Girardet 152, 157.
131. Nyrop 242.
132. Girardet 27.
133. McMichael xvi.
134. Yousaf 235.
135. Girardet 240.
136. Urban 128.

137. Yousaf 218.
138. Rubin 1. The nomadic population of Afghanistan is a decidedly small fraction of its overall population.
139. Nyrop 87.
140. Michael Maren, "Feeding a Famine", Forbes Media Critic Fall 1994: 4.
141. Anna Husarska, a Medicine Sans Frontieres volunteer "The Bodyguards: A Report from the Famine" America Online: Somali Homepage 15 February 1993: 2. *Unimix* is a dietary mixture consisting of 40% rice or corn flour, 30% precooked beans, 15% sugar and 15% oil. Three times a day the children receive a bowl of Unimix, a glass of dried skim milk and two protein biscuits.
142. Sahnoun 15-21 & 32-33.
143. United States Agency for International Development, "USAID Report of Former Recipients of U.S. Economic and Humanitarian Assistance" USAID Assistance Report March 1996 March 1996: 2. Afghanistan along with 17 other nations was "dropped from assistance programs because they were either not good partners in development or because these overseas missions were small and expensive to operate."
144. Rubin 263-264. U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan, Robert Oakley, offered \$2 million in 1990 in return for Mullah Nasim of the Interim Islamic Government of Afghanistan ceasing production of opium. He agreed and ordered a reduction in the amount of opium planted in Spring 1990, but he was assassinated in March. Also, Oakley was notified that "his agreement with Nasim violated U.S. policy against negotiating with drug traffickers, and the United States refused to honor those promises."
145. Girardet 210-212. Some international aid organizations are prevented from working inside Afghanistan by their charters which require them to preform aid coordination at government level.
146. Ibid.
147. Yousaf 233.
148. European Commission Humanitarian Office (ECHO), "ECHO Sticks it Out, Refusing to Yield to Donor Fatigue." ECHO Report 1994 19 March 1996 (Internet): 1.
149. Rubin 283.
150. USAID FY 1996 Fund Report 2.



151. Famine Early Warning System (FEWS), "Somalia" FEWS Bulletin January 1996: 1.
152. USAID FY 1996 Fund Request 2.
153. Reuters, February 22, 1996. Madelaine Albright, UN Security Council President, made this comment after several warlords of Somalia appealed to the UN for continuation of humanitarian aid deliveries.
154. Helander 2.
155. United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees, Geneva "Background Paper on Somali Refugees and Asylum Seekers" Background Paper on Somalia, October 1994: 1.
156. United Nations Famine Early Warning System (FEWS), "East Africa and the Horn" The FEWS Bulletin 26 January 1996: 3.
157. Girardet 206.
158. Ibid. 53.
159. Doornbos 160.
160. Cable News Network (CNN) "Afghan Rebels Bomb Residential Areas" CNN Internet News Briefs 26 November 1995: 1.
161. Cable News Network "Fifteen Said Wounded in Rocket Attack on Kabul" CNN Internet World News Briefs (Internet News Release) 13 January 1996: 1.
162. Wendy Driscoll, CARE "CARE in Afghanistan" CARE Country Profile: Afghanistan 20 March 1996: 2.
163. Girardet 6.
164. CNN "World News Briefs and South Africa Chronology" CNN Internet News Briefs 20 March 1996: 1.
165. United Nations, "Further report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operations in Somalia" United Nations Document Report to the UN 18 July 1994: 2.
166. Ibid.
167. United States Department of State, "Somalia Human Rights Practices, 1994" US Department of State Report February 1995: 2.

168. United States Department of State, "Afghanistan Human Rights Practices, 1994" US Department of State Internet Release 1995: 1.
169. Ahmed 113.
170. Samatar 74.
171. United Nations Development Program, "United Nations Volunteers: Humanitarian Relief and Rehabilitation" United Nations Internet Release 1996: 1.
172. David D. Laitin and Said S. Samatar, Somalia: Nation in Search of a State (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1987) 40-41.
173. Overby 199.
174. United Nations Department of Public Information, "The United Nations and the Situation in Somalia" Reference Paper, April 1995 , April 1995: 10.
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176. UN Report on Somalia, 19 January 1996, 2.
177. USAID- BHR-OFDA, "Somalia: Civil Strife" Situation Report No. 1, FY 1995 30 December 1994: 1.
178. Driscoll 2.
179. ECHO 1.
180. Driscoll 2 and Save the Children, "Giving and Spending" Save the Children Mission Statement 1995: 1.
181. United Nations Secretary-General's Report 1995.
182. Terrence Lyons in A CNN interview???
183. United Nations Public Information Department, "Secretary-General's Report" 24 May and 18 July, 1994.
184. Metz 117.
185. United Nations Public Information Department, "United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs bulletins", 12 February 1996 and 30 June 1995.

186. Rubin 227.
187. Ibid. 256.
188. Driscoll 1.
189. Girardet 165.
190. CARE Public Information Department, "CARE Country Profile: Afghanistan," 2. The Initiative includes landmine education and training in demining operations. The programs goal is to demine agricultural lands to allow people to return to their land.
191. Nyrop 315.
192. McMichael 103-104.
193. Save the Children, "Lethal Weapons: Landmines, Lives and Livelihoods" UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (Internet release) November 1989: 1.
194. Nyrop 315. Probing is accomplished by crawling on the belly and poking a bayonet over every square inch of terrain.
195. United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, "The United Nations Global Land-Mine Crisis Meeting, Geneva" Internet Release 5-7 July 1995: 1.
196. United Nations Department of Public Information, "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Somalia" Internet Release 24 May 1994: 11, section VII.
197. FEWS Bulletin 4. Somalia's growing seasons are divided into Gu, or main, growing season with heavy rains lasting from July to August, and Deyr, or secondary, season with lighter rains in the winter, October to January.
198. UNV report 1.
199. USAID Somalia Development Fund Request FY 1996.
200. Doornbos 159.
201. Maren 2.
202. Sahnoun 39.
203. Makinda 47.

204. Reuters 9 February 1996, Internet News Release 1.
205. Rubin 247-248.
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207. Afghanistan News Service, "Kabul Bombed by Jets" Afghan News Service Internet Release 3 January 1996: 2.
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209. United Nations Public Information Department, "United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs bulletin," 8 June.
210. Yousaf 181.
211. Rubin 280.
212. Nyrop 231-232.
213. Ibid. 234.
214. Afghanistan News Service, March 14, 1996 delivered over CNN.
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216. Ibid., xviii.
217. Ibid., 99.
218. Ibid., 101.
219. Overby 200.
220. DeLong and Tuckey 99.
221. Ibid., x.
222. Thomas Sowell, The Vision of the Anointed: Self-Congratulation as a Basis for Social Policy (New York: Basic Books, 1995) 10. From President Kennedy's February 1, 1962 address on the Public Welfare Program, (H. Doc. No. 325), Congressional Record-House, p. 1405.


223. Ibid., 13. The author also notes that all government-provided in-kind benefits increased eight fold from 1965 to 1969 and more than twenty fold by 1974, p. 13.
224. Girardet 210-212.
225. Lewis, *Blood and Bone* 179.
226. Ahmed 115.
227. Doornbos 59.
228. Ibid., 58.
229. Maren, "Culture of Aid," 1.
230. Ibid., 2. In Ioan Lewis's book, *Blood and Bone*, p. 209 The mild narcotic *Ghat*, *qaat* or as the Yemenis spell it, *qat* is described as a bush whose fresh leaves produce a mild stimulant effect when chewed. The production of *ghat* was made illegal in 1983 but this ordinance has been largely ignored.
231. Ibid.
232. Maren, "Feeding a Famine," 1.
233. Doornbos 61.
234. Bernhard Helander, "Somalia: Aid Fuels the Conflict", News from NAI 1995: 3. When the document creating UNOSOM II expired the United Nations created two offices to take its place. UNOSOM and the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS).
235. Maren, "Culture of Aid," 1.
236. "Arms Reduction and Global Reconstruction", The Economist Magazine 1992.
237. The New Republican Magazine 18 May 1992.
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239. United Nations Department of Public Information, "United Nations Statement by the President of the Security Council #77," 30 November 1994. The Special Mission recommended to negotiate and oversee a cease-fire, to establish a national security force to collect heavy weapons, to form a transitional government to lay the groundwork for a democratic government.

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
242. Maren, "Culture of Aid", 1.

Illustration 7.1 Somali Ethnic Groups



*Blood and Bone*, Ioan M. Lewis. Red Sea Press, 1994.

Illustration 7.2 Afghan Ethnic Groups

*Afghanistan: A Country Study**Ethnic Groups in Afghanistan and Adjacent Areas*

*Afghanistan: A Country Study*, Nyrop and Seekins. The American University Press, 1986.



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